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American Western states and virtually every country and state with 
positive water resources law are in perfect agreement about the wisdom 
of treating their water resources as public property. Not surprisingly, this 
has led most Western states to articulate a goal of managing these 
resources in the public interest. But the meaning of the term “public 
interest,” especially in the context of water resources management, is far 
from clear. This Article strives to bring clarity to that issue. It begins by 
exploring three theoretical approaches that might be used for defining the 
public interest in water resources law before urging an approach that 
prioritizes communal values. It then calls on each state to articulate its 
own, objective definition of the public interest—one that can serve as a 
meaningful legal standard. Included in this call to action is an outline of 
a public, deliberative process that states might use to formulate such a 
definition. This is followed by an investigation of the current attitudes of 
Western states toward the public interest standard, which includes a 
survey of whether and how a public interest review is incorporated into 
each state’s administration of water rights. The survey reveals that most 
Western states routinely fail to meet their obligation to consider the public 
interest in water rights administration, despite unambiguous public 
interest mandates. I conclude by recommending changes to existing water 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and 
independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State 
to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, 
except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may 
permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public 
interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing 
as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of [the] opinion that 
the private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have 
deeper roots.1 
 
No appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is 
demanded by the public interests.2 
 
Ask any resident of the Western United States to describe local water law, and 
you will likely hear that the “prior appropriation” doctrine protects private water 
users according to the order that they first diverted water for beneficial uses. “First 
in time, first in right” is the jingle often used to describe Western water law; that is, 
the water rights of an earlier appropriator have legal priority over the rights of a 
junior appropriator.3 However, it is probably unlikely that the same Westerner is 
aware that water has been deemed the property of the State from the earliest 
incarnations of the prior appropriation doctrine. That is, public interest 
considerations limit the private right to use water in virtually every Western state 
(the notable exception being Colorado).4  
  
                                                   
1 Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (Holmes, J.). 
2 WYO. CONST. art. VIII, §3.  
3 Under the prior appropriation system, the first appropriator to put water to beneficial 
use receives their entire allocation of water before the next person in priority receives any 
water. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.01 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 
LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2019) [hereinafter WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS]. 
 
A property right in the use of water is created by diversion of the water from a 
stream (or lake) and its application to a beneficial use. Water can be used at any 
location, without regard to the position of place of use in relation to the stream. 
In the event of a shortage of supply, water will be supplied up to a limit of the 
right in order of temporal priority: the last man to divert and make use of the 
stream is the first to have his supply cut off. Id. (citing CHARLES J. MEYERS, A 
HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 4 
(1971)). The allocation of water proceeds in this way until water is no longer 
available, either because the stream has run dry, or as contended in this Article, 
because the public interest would not be served by allowing any further allocation.  
 
4 Colorado is the notable exception to this general rule, as discussed infra Part VII.  
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The failure of many Western states to embrace their responsibility to protect 
public values in water has profound consequences for water management. So long 
as priorities are maintained, private water rights are commonly allocated and may 
be used without regard for public needs.5 If the public or its elected officials believe 
that water should be preserved in the stream for recreational, aesthetic, or other 
purposes, then those interests are typically asked to stand in line with every other 
water user and trust their fate to the prior appropriation system.6 Too often, this leads 
to dewatered streams while inefficient irrigation practices abound.7  
In this Article, I argue for restoring the public interest to its rightful role as a 
universal limitation on water rights, with a particular focus on the Western United 
States. I begin in Part II by exploring how the public interest concept informs public 
policy generally. This explanation is offered to identify and illuminate a framework 
that can help guide the allocation and administration of water resources. In Part III, 
I proceed to outline different perspectives on what the term “public interest” means, 
offering a definition centered on common public values. Then, in Part IV, I describe 
a model deliberative process whereby water management agencies could fairly and 
meaningfully define the public interest. This is followed by a brief explanation of 
the distinction in Part V between the public interest and the public trust doctrine. 
These two related but distinct ideas are easily conflated, and I explain why my focus 
is on the public interest. Instream flow laws are briefly addressed in Part VI to 
explain how they can unintentionally undermine efforts to protect public interest 
values in water.  
In Part VII, I turn to an historical look at the evolution of Western water law 
and an overview of the water appropriation process typical of modern administrative 
systems. This leads to a survey of the water allocation laws of twelve Western states 
in Part VIII, with a focus on how the laws in these states protect (or were designed 
to protect) the public interest. While the record is mixed, many states appear to give 
short shrift to positive law8 standards requiring consideration of the public interest 
in making water allocation decisions.  
All of this sets up a discussion in Part IX of a possible path forward that is more 
sensitive to public interest concerns. The entrenched policies embedded in the 
traditional water management schemes employed by Western states will be difficult 
to overcome, but regulatory and judicial reforms hold some promise for better 
protecting public values, and this part analyzes the opportunities and obstacles to 
                                                   
5 See, e.g., Interview with Pat Tyrell, Wyo. State Engineer in Cheyenne, Wyo. (July 12, 
2007), discussed infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
6 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-1001(b) (2019). 
7 See, e.g., Todd Reeve, Harnessing a Voluntary Market to Restore Flow to Dewatered 
Rivers and Streams, GLOBAL WATER FORUM (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.globalwaterforum 
.org/2012/08/14/harnessing-a-voluntary-market-to-restore-flow-to-dewatered-rivers-and-
streams/ [https://perma.cc/5JNJ-WQET]. 
8 The reference to “positive law” used in this Article refers to legislative or 
constitutional pronouncements, in contrast to judicial precedent. See Positive Law, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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implementing appropriate reforms. I conclude in Part X with recommendations for 
states and other parties that might want to bring about much-needed reforms that 
will better protect the public values associated with our water resources. 
 
II.  THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND PUBLIC POLICY 
 
The public interest as a guiding principle of public policy is not unique to the 
water resources field. One of the more prominent and longstanding American 
examples of a policy guided by a public interest standard is the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 (FCA).9 The FCA established the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), which is tasked with “regulat[ing] interstate 
and foreign commerce in communication . . . without discrimination . . . .”10 To carry 
out this mission, the Act authorizes the FCC to “prescribe such rules and regulations 
as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this Act.”11 
But what does it mean that regulations are “in the public interest”? Two recent FCC 
regulatory actions on net neutrality shed light on this question, even as they raise the 
prospect that protecting the public interest is a futile endeavor, so long as the term 
lacks an objective definition.  
In 2015, the FCC issued a final rule barring broadband internet providers from 
blocking, throttling, or engaging in the paid prioritization of their online services.12 
This action sought to ensure that internet providers treat all content on the web 
equally and non-preferentially—an elusive objective known as net neutrality.13 By 
classifying consumer broadband service as a “telecommunications service,” the FCC 
claimed it had the authority to regulate internet service providers as utilities under 
the common-carrier provisions of the FCA, and it repeatedly invoked the public 
interest to support its decision.14 Less than three years later, however, following a 
change in leadership at the FCC, the Commission issued a new rule repealing the 
2015 rule.15 In particular, the FCC stripped broadband services of their designation 
as a “telecommunications service” and opined that the FCC lacked the authority to 
regulate such services.16 “Given the unknown needs of the networks of the future,” 
the order reads, “it is our determination that the utility-style regulations . . . run 
contrary to the public interest.”17 In short, two diametrically opposed regulations 
were both purportedly cloaked in the public interest.  
  
                                                   
9 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151–624 (2018)). 
10 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
11 Id. § 201(b) (emphasis added). 
12 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (repealed). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at passim (referencing the “public interest” a total of 122 times). 
15 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, and 20). 
16 Id. at 7853. 
17 Id. at 7871. 
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The dueling invocation of the “public interest” in the net neutrality example 
above lays bare a key tension that I address in this Article: If, under a statute, the 
public interest can be constructed to mean one thing but also the opposite of that 
very thing, then that statute fails to establish a meaningful regulatory standard. Put 
another way, the “public interest” must have an ascertainable, objective meaning to 
avoid being hollow, surplus language.18 Moreover, if the term lacks an objective 
meaning, then it cannot logically serve as an “intelligible principle” sufficient to 
support a constitutional delegation of legislative power.19 Many state courts also 
apply similar nondelegation doctrines, rooted in their own constitutional separation 
of powers jurisprudence.20  
In this Article, I argue that, while subject to interpretation and nuance, the 
public interest must be reducible to an objective definition. Only then can it serve as 
a proper limitation on delegated power sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
standards.21 This is not to say that the public interest can mean only one thing. 
Because the public interest reflects a societal value judgment, and because societal 
values evolve, so too can the meaning of the term. But as I attempt to demonstrate 
below in Part III, the public interest must have a discrete meaning that derives from 
                                                   
18 The rule against surplusage is a time-honored canon of construction that urges judges 
to construe text such that each word and phrase has meaning. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012); see also 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“These words cannot be meaningless, else 
they would not have been used.”). 
19 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (holding 
that “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is 
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”). Yet the Supreme Court has already held 
that the public interest standard in the FCA does, in fact, afford the FCC a sufficient basis 
upon which it may exercise its regulatory power. Nat’l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 
319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943). 
20 See, e.g., State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Alaska 1987) 
(discussing application of federal delegation doctrine cases by state courts); El Dorado Oil 
Works v. McColgan, 215 P.2d 4, 8–9 (Cal. 1950) (“The essential requirement [of the 
nondelegation doctrine] is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to administer the act is directed to conform” 
(internal citations omitted)); People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 409–10 (Colo. 1998) 
(discussing the judicial standards and development of Colorado’s nondelegation doctrine); 
Newport Int’l Univ., Inc. v. State, 186 P.3d 382, 388 (Wyo. 2008) (“The nondelegation 
doctrine is a judicial construction which limits the exercise of power by actors not elected to 
or otherwise employed within a designated branch of government . . . State constitutional 
vesting clauses, which entrust certain branches of government with specified functions and 
powers, are the primary source of limitations on delegations.”).  
21 To be sure, courts might have greater flexibility to construe the public interest to 
accommodate two different—potentially even inconsistent—interpretations outside of the 
nondelegation doctrine context. One example is in the context of a deferential agency review 
standard such as that articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865 (1984).  
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an objective framework. To put it another way, the public interest cannot simply be 
applied to mean whatever an individual regulator decides it should mean.22 
This leads me to ask how best to define “public interest,” recognizing that 
defining the term is a matter that has particular resonance for a common-pool 
resource such as water. Like the air we breathe, the public understands that water is 
a communal resource with important public values, and modern societies expect 
their governments to manage water resources responsibly and protect those public 
values.23  
 
III.  DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
Despite its widespread acceptance as a core principle for evaluating policy and 
its exhaustive treatment in scholarly literature, the public interest remains an elusive 
concept, and scholars and policymakers alike have struggled to ascertain a precise, 
normative meaning.24 The public interest surely encompasses “community values,” 
but what about private values that also arguably enhance public welfare? And what 
role does subjective bias play in influencing the proper choice and scope of relevant 
values?25 While one can potentially conjure a wide range of approaches for 
                                                   
22 For example, it seems beyond peradventure that if a government agency gave all of 
the water resources in a particular basin to a single for-profit entity, without limitation, that 
decision would be contrary to the public interest. 
23 See Mitch Tobin, 7 Things I Learned Studying Public Opinion on Water, NEWS 
DEEPLY: WATER DEEPLY (May 1, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/articles/2017 
/05/01/7-things-i-learned-studying-public-opinion-on-water [https://perma.cc/8267-
UKKH]. 
24 See RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE 
NORMATIVE DISCOURSE OF POLITICS 9–13 (1966) (providing an extensive analysis of the 
“public interest” that distinguishes between its commendatory and descriptive meanings). As 
a commendatory phrase, the public interest occupies an important role in political rhetoric. 
Id. The other meaning is descriptive and is used to whether a certain policy fits the defined 
public interest criteria. Id. Rhetorical maneuvers abound in politics, leading politicians to 
sometimes invoke the phrase for its commendatory meaning without carefully thinking 
through what criteria should be invoked to apply the descriptive meaning. Id. The arguments 
found in the remainder of this Article focus on the descriptive meaning of the public interest. 
See also C.W. Cassinelli, Some Reflections on the Concept of the Public Interest, 69 ETHICS 
48–49 (1958) (identifying three categories of problems with trying to define the public 
interest, but also suggesting that “an opposition between the public interest and individual 
interests is not consistent with a democratic ethic . . . .”). For reasons stated in this Part of 
the Article, I largely reject this claim put forth by Professor Cassinelli.  
25 Subjective views inevitably influence the interpretation of the public interest, but 
subjective perspectives should not be confused with selfishness. The former describes a 
particular interpretation of communal values influenced by one’s “location” (geographically, 
socially, etc.) within a “common world.” See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 57 
(1958). The latter constitutes a violation of duty by explicitly ignoring the consequences of 
an action. See FLATHMAN, supra note 24, at 26–28. The presence of subjective values 
requires the public interest to incorporate these often-competing views in the policy process. 
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elucidating the public interest, they generally fit into three categories: (A) an 
economic or utilitarian approach; (B) a pluralist approach; and (C) a view of the 
public interest as solely reflective of shared communal and societal values.  
 
A.  The Utilitarian Approach to the Public Interest 
 
The first of the common frameworks defining the public interest takes an 
economic or utilitarian approach, asserting that the public interest be defined to 
promote decisions that maximize overall wealth;26 or restated in more egalitarian 
and progressive-era terms, actions that afford “the greatest good of the greatest 
number in the long run.”27 A utilitarian approach has several advantages. It offers an 
objective standard that can, in theory, be readily ascertained. This is because 
maximizing net present values relies on defining costs and benefits that, even if 
difficult to quantify, will offer objective variables upon which to base the public 
interest. Moreover, if initial projections of costs and benefits of a decision or choice 
turn out to be inaccurate or incomplete, or if values or conditions change the 
utilitarian calculus, the decision can often be adapted to reflect the new 
information.28 In this way, utilitarianism is also inherently flexible.  
                                                   
The procedural component of the public interest will be further outlined below. 
26 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 12–13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) [hereinafter BENTHAM, AN 
INTRODUCTION] (“The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons 
who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community 
then is, what?—the sum of the interest of the several members who compose it . . . . An 
action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, 
to utility, (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to 
augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.”). 
27 Jeremy Bentham first articulated the idea that “it is the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.” JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT 
ON THE COMMENTARIES AND THE FRAGMENT OF GOVERNMENT 393 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A 
Hart eds., 2010). Gifford Pinchot, the renowned conservation and first Chief of the U.S. 
Forest Service, adapted this principle, adding a time element: “Where conflicting interests 
must be reconciled, the question shall always be answered from the standpoint of the greatest 
good of the greatest number in the long run.” See Pinchot and Utilitarianism, THE GREATEST 
GOOD, https://www.fs.fed.us/greatestgood/press/mediakit/facts/pinchot.shtml [https://perma 
.cc/DTT6-6UEJ] (last visited June 27, 2018).  
28 Professor Douglas Grant has written extensively on the public interest’s function in 
water policy. See, e.g., Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation 
and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1987) 
[hereinafter Grant, Public Interest Review] (examining the evolution of public interest review 
to reflect public values). Grant argues that the public interest serves to assess and weigh the 
externalities of a given water project or policy. Id. at 702–707. Grant later characterizes this 
cost-benefit-style approach to the public interest as the “maximum benefits model.” See 
Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest of Water Allocation in the West, 9 U. DENV. 
WTR. L. REV. 485, 490, 498 (2006) [hereinafter Grant, Two Models]. Such a model, Grant 
argues, has been able to incorporate new values, such as ecological values, into public 
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On the other hand, a utilitarian approach tends to play out in terms of costs and 
benefits that can be readily measured in monetary terms.29 This often excludes or 
undervalues costs and benefits for intangible assets such as aesthetic, existential, or 
communal values,30 and it is these shared values that are perhaps most reflective of 
the public’s interests. Moreover, efforts to quantify the value of such intangible 
assets are often tried but rarely succeed.31 Indeed, the results are almost always 
presented in terms of the economic value of environmental assets to humans, as 
opposed to any inherent value that they might possess.32 How should a society, for 
example, value a free-flowing stream? Is it enough to identify the economic values 
associated with riparian property, or with fishing, boating, or otherwise recreating 
in or on the stream? Or does a free-flowing stream have some intrinsic value that 
should also be taken into account? And how should society value the use and 
enjoyment of the stream by future generations? As the world’s population grows and 
fewer water resources remain pristine, is it not likely that those water resources that 
continue to survive in a relatively unspoiled condition will hold far greater value to 








                                                   
interest review. Id. at 495. As suggested in the text, cost-benefit analysis is fraught with 
problems, especially in the context of assessing the value of commonly held public resources 
like water. See id. at 495–98.  
29 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Challenge of Regulating Objectively, 31 NEW 
ATLANTIS 136 (2011) (reviewing DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010)), https://www.thenewatla 
ntis.com/publications/the-challenge-of-regulating-objectively [https://perma.cc/M58J-
FHK2] (“The core argument [against cost-benefit analysis] is that cost-benefit calculations 
are incapable of capturing the full range of ethical, aesthetic, and other concerns that should 
motivate regulatory decision-making . . . .”). 
30 Id. at 143. 
31 See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006) (presenting one of the more thoughtful, though ultimately 
supportive, critiques of cost-benefit analysis); see also Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar & 
David M. Driesen, Cost–Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 48 (2009) (reviewing ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATION) (suggesting that 
given the limitations of cost-benefit analyses (CBAs), other decision-making tools might be 
preferable). 
32 See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (discussing the troubling 
problem of placing a value on human life, although that is not likely to pose a significant 
issue for implementing a public interest standard in the context of water rights). 
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these questions, a utilitarian or cost-benefit approach tends to minimize and 
sometimes even disregard current and future public values that are commonly 
shared, in favor of private and present economic values.33 Many see this as a 
distorted view of the public interest.34  
Finally, a utilitarian approach fails to subjectively consider who benefits. A 
public interest definition that maximizes net benefits but fails to address distributive 
justice35 concerns will be difficult to defend. For example, a decision that grants a 
handful of industrial users control over finite water resources might maximize 
overall wealth, but if these users dry up a river and thereby deprive the general public 
of access to water to meet basic human needs, as well as their traditional rights to 
fish and recreate in the river, then such a decision hardly seems to be in the public 
interest—at least if the “public” is understood to encompass society as a whole. 
 
B.  The Pluralist View of the Public Interest 
 
Somewhat related to the utilitarian approach to defining public interest is the 
pluralist view, which seeks to aggregate the individual preferences of interested 
parties and filter those views through a political or democratic process.36 This 
                                                   
33 See FLATHMAN, supra note 24, at 33–37 (making the moral argument that, while 
individuals are usually motivated by self-interest, they should sometimes support policies 
that are contrary to their own self-interest yet support the greater public interest). Flathman 
criticizes scholars, most notably Jeremy Bentham, who define the public interest by 
aggregating individual interests. Id.; see also BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION supra note 26, 
at 12 (“It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is 
the interest of the individual. A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, 
of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the 
same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.”). Nonetheless, Flathman acknowledges 
that individual interest “is to be highly valued, fostered, and protected as a means of 
strengthening the body politic.” FLATHHAM, supra note 24, at 37.  
34 See Sinden et al., supra note 31, at 62; see also Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, 
Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 PENN L. REV. 
1553, 1567 (2002); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 
REGULATION 33, 36–37 (1981). 
35 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (addressing the problem 
of distributive justice and defining the concept as the socially just distribution of goods in a 
society). 
36 Bentham arguably supports this approach, as well as pure utilitarianism. He argues, 
for example, that “[t]he interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of 
the several members who compose it.” BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 26, at 12. 
Bentham further defines the “principle of utility” as the “principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever.” Id. at 11–12. Individuals and political leaders alike 
determine the principle of utility by summing the pleasure and pain of an action to determine 
if the action produces a beneficial result. Id. at 12. This process of summing pain and pleasure 
works on both the individual and communal level. Id. Bentham stresses, “It is in vain to talk 
of the interest of the community without understanding what is the interest of the individual.” 
Id. Understanding the interest of a communal “body” begins by understanding the individual 
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framework privileges majoritarian views, as determined either by popular vote or 
the vote of elected representatives.37  
As a practical matter, legislatures can and sometimes do define the public 
interest, thereby establishing a legal standard that limits the discretion and influence 
of policymakers in the executive branch.38 But legislative choices made by elected 
officials in a representative democracy may or may not reflect majoritarian views, 
and might be more in step with utilitarian or communal principles (as described in 
Sections A and C of this Part, respectively). Moreover, such choices often seem 
incoherent because they lack fealty to any precise theory or principle. Indeed, 
legislatures can announce radically different versions of the public interest that are 
more reflective of political views and the influence of well-financed lobbyists and 
politically connected participants in the decision-making process. This is essentially 
what happened with the FCC’s net neutrality rules.39  
A pluralist approach also suffers from being both unpredictable and unstable. 
Indeed, unlike the utilitarian or communal approaches, pluralism makes no pretense 
of seeking an objective understanding of the public interest, focusing instead on the 
values and preferences of those individuals allowed to engage in the decision process 
as aggregated by the decision-maker.40 And because decision-makers are typically 
                                                   
interests that shape that body; after understanding individual interests the community’s 
interest is then “the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.” Id.  
37 For a general review of pluralist approaches in the political sphere, see Richard 
Bellamy, Dealing with Difference: Four Models of Pluralist Politics, 53 PARLIAMENTARY 
AFFAIRS 198 (2000). 
38 See, for example, the definition of the public interest in the Alaska Water Use Act, 
which asks the agency decision-maker to balance a range of public and private interests in 
deciding whether to issue a water permit. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2019). The statute 
provides that the state water commissioner should issue a water permit only if he finds, 
among other things, that the issuance of the permit is in the public interest. In determining 
the public interest, the commissioner must consider:  
 
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation; (2) the 
effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed appropriation; (3) the 
effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational opportunities; (4) the 
effect on public health; (5) the effect of loss of alternate uses of water that might 
be made within a reasonable time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed 
appropriation; (6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed 
appropriation; (7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the 
appropriation; and (8) the effect upon access to navigable or public water.  
 
Id.  
39 See supra Part II; see also Timothy Karr, Exposing D.C.’s Anti-Democratic 
Opposition to Net Neutrality, FREEPRESS (June 19, 2019), https://www.freepress.net/our-
response/expert-analysis/explainers/exposing-dcs-anti-democratic-opposition-net-neutrality 
[https://perma.cc/NGW9-GJ29]. 
40 See Bellamy, supra note 37. 
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elected or appointed, they are constantly changing. With shifts in power come 
different political and ideological views about how to define the public interest.41 In 
this sense, the public interest may not reflect the public’s interests at all, but instead 
the interests of rent-seekers42 who are able to commandeer the political and agency 
decision-making processes. 
Like utilitarianism, pluralism also tends to favor present interests over those of 
future generations because it essentially responds to time-sensitive pressure from 
interested parties and organizations.43 It is entirely possible—if not likely—that 
some of these parties will promote the protection of both public values and the needs 
of future generations. Still, it is difficult to imagine that such arguments will prevail 
over the demands made by present users, especially for those water resources facing 
significant stress. Concerted lobbying efforts of water-intensive industries, such as 
agriculture, for example, tend to overpower concerns raised by individual members 
of the public.44 The experience in many places where streams have been entirely 
dewatered by private, consumptive uses would appear to bear out the observation 
that communal values often receive short shrift when water resources are claimed 
chiefly for private uses.45 
                                                   
41 The constant turnover in elected officials and agency leadership has prompted some 
scholars to favor judicial application of the Public Trust Doctrine for water resources rather 
than the public interest standard found in legislation. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching 
Our Wagon to a Dim Star: Why Outmoded Water Codes and the Public Interest Review 
Cannot Protect the Public Trust in Western Water Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 307 
(2013). 
42 “Rent seeking is the attempt by particular groups to persuade governments to grant 
them . . . valuable monopolies or legal privileges. If their rent seeking is successful, such 
benefits could add up to a substantial transfer of wealth to these privileged groups from the 
general public.” EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE – A PRIMER 76 (2012). 
43 See Bellamy, supra note 37. 
44 See, e.g., Noah Gallagher Shannon, The Water Wars of Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (July 
19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/magazine/the-water-wars-of-arizona.html 
[https://perma.cc/M2LJ-MUU9] (chronicling the experiences of rural landowners in Arizona 
who are unable to access groundwater to meet even their most basic needs due to the 
depletion of local aquifers). Industrial irrigation is responsible for 70% of the water 
withdrawn from aquifers in the region, but residents “felt there were too many forces already 
marshaled against them, including the state’s strong agriculture and ranching lobbies,” to 
change local policies. Id. 
45 See, e.g., River, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyc 
lopedia/river/ [https://perma.cc/P29V-UCWF] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019) (“An unsettling 
number of large rivers—including the Colorado, Rio Grande, Yellow, Indus, Ganges, Amu 
Darya, Murray, and Nile—are now so overtapped that they discharge little or no water to the 
sea for months at a time.”); Laura Paskus, Time’s Out for the Rio, SANTA FE REP. (Apr. 15, 
2014), https://www.sfreporter.com/news/coverstories/2014/04/15/times-out-for-the-rio/ 
[https://perma.cc/LQ5K-SRYJ] (“It doesn’t take driving 1,000 miles south of Pilar to Texas, 
where about 400 miles of the Rio Grande are almost always dry, to see sandy riverbed. Just 
look south of Albuquerque between June and the end of October. Last year, about 30 miles 
dried.”). 
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C.  Public Interest as Shared Communal and Societal Values 
 
A third theory views the public interest as solely reflective of shared communal 
and societal values. The essence of this approach is recognizing that public interests 
are distinctly different from private interests and describing the communal aspect of 
the public interest in normative, values-based terms.46 A communal perspective of 
the public interest acknowledges the value of private interests in common resources, 
but only to the extent that the shared, public values of those resources are protected 
first.47  
This theory might seem particularly anomalous in the context of traditional 
Lockean notions of private property,48 but it finds strong support in the water 
resources context for two reasons. First, the property at issue is water, which—unlike 
land—is traditionally viewed as public property.49 Water users acquire a 
usufructuary50 right in water, but nothing more.51 Second, notions of property that 
informed the early architects of the American experiment—and that trace their 
                                                   
46 Communal values include trans-subjective values that are devoid of self-interest and 
can be “justifiably imposed” on all members of a community, particularly in instances when 
there are two competing interests. FLATHMAN, supra note 24, at 37–42. These communal 
values are determined by filtering context-specific information, making the public interest 
incorporate a procedural component further described in the next paragraph. Id. When 
assessing if a policy can be justifiably imposed, public interest review depends on what 
Flathman calls the principle of “generalization.” Id. Policy typically affects particular 
groups—or “classes”—of individuals. Id. at 70–72. The principle of generalization dictates 
that a policy can be justifiably imposed on all members of a particular class. Id. 
47 The word “first” should be emphasized here because it has particular application to 
water law in the American West. In many Western states, the prior appropriation doctrine 
can cause certain State-held water rights to be subject to private uses, even if those uses 
violate the communal values held by the State’s citizens. 
48 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 213 (2d ed. 1887), 
(“[L]abour . . . gave a right of property, wherever anyone was pleased to employ it upon what 
was common . . . .”).  
49 Water as public property is a common refrain in the constitutions of western states. 
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (“The water of every natural stream, not heretofore 
appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, 
and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state . . . .”). 
50 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “usufruct” as “[a] right for a certain period to use 
and enjoy the fruits of another’s property without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing 
for any natural deterioration in the property over time.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019). In the case of water, one can acquire a property right to use it, but title to the water 
itself remains vested in the State. See, e.g., In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1096 (Or. 1924). 
(In Oregon, “[t]he owner [of a water right] has no property in the water itself, but a simple 
usufruct. The [Oregon] Water Code declares the waters of the state to be public property.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
51 See Spear T. Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 127 (Neb. 2005) (“A right to 
appropriate surface water . . . is not an ownership of property.”). 
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origins back to Aristotle52—suggest stronger support for egalitarian notions of 
property rights than John Locke might have preferred, with a concomitant focus on 
the common good. Thomas Jefferson, for example, expressed a view of property that 
was far more circumspect about rights of inheritance and alienability. In Jefferson’s 
view, it is society that creates and thus ultimately controls property rights.53 Jefferson 
thought it “self-evident” that “the earth belongs to the living in usufruct; that the 
dead have neither power nor rights over it.”54 Whatever one thinks of Jefferson’s 
“self-evident” claim, it seems remarkably salient in the context of water rights, 
where public ownership is the norm, and where private rights are commonly 
understood as usufructuary. 
Gregory Alexander offers further support for the idea that public and private 
interests are distinct. In Commodity & Propriety, Alexander argues that “the core of 
American republican thought during the eighteenth century was the idea that private 
‘interests’ could and should be subordinated to the common welfare of the polity.”55 
In making his case, he reflects on how early Americans embraced a view of the 
public good distinct from private interests: 
 
The holistic conception of society made the notion of the public good as 
the central objective of political life intelligible. . . . The common good 
then, was not merely what the consensus of society’s individual members 
wished, but a substantive conception of the moral good that transcended 
individual interests . . . .56 
 
In Public Rights and Private Interests,57 Hannah Arendt takes an approach to 
the public interest not unlike Alexander’s. Arendt argues that public rights and the 
public interest must be understood as distinct from private rights and private 
interests. As Arendt explains, the public interest is more than a sum of private 
interests.58 On the contrary, the public sphere is inherently distinct from, and often 
at odds with, private values and rights: 
 
These two, the private and the public, must be considered separately, for 
the aims and chief concerns in each case are different. Throughout his life 
man moves constantly in two different orders of existence: he moves 
within what is his own, and he also moves in a sphere that is common to 
him and his fellowmen. The “public good,” the concerns of the citizen, is 
                                                   
52 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 29 (1997). 
53 Id. at 27. 
54 Id. at 26. 
55 Id. at 29. 
56 Id.  
57 Hannah Arendt, Public Rights and Private Interests: In Response to Charles Frankel, 
in SMALL COMFORTS FOR HARD TIMES: HUMANISTS ON PUBLIC POLICY 103, 103–04 
(Michael J. Mooney & Florian Stuber eds., 1977). 
58 Id. at 103.  
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indeed the common good because it is localized in the world which we 
have in common without owning it. The reckless pursuit of private 
interests in the public-political sphere is as ruinous for the public good as 
the arrogant attempts of governments to regulate the private lives of their 
citizens are ruinous for private happiness.59  
 
Arendt thus sees the public sphere as a world beyond the self. All citizens—
including those who came before us and those who will come after us—share in this 
public space, and all must suppress their private interests to enjoy it.60 
Arendt acknowledges the difficulty of premising the public interest upon the 
suppression of one’s own private interests. This task requires that individuals act 
impartially, and Arendt notes that “such impartiality . . . is resisted at every turn by 
the urgency of one’s self-interests, which are always more urgent than the common 
good.”61 But she sees such resistance as necessary to preserve public values. In a 
civil society, people must sacrifice certain individual interests to promote shared, 
communal values.62 When private interests are allowed to influence the public realm, 
common values are sacrificed for personal values. 
In seeking to shield the public interest from private intrusions, Arendt 
acknowledges the important role of private interests in a modern society.63 But she 
insists that private interests in common resources must yield to the shared, public 
values of those resources and that these public values must be protected first: “What 
is necessary for the public realm is that it be shielded from the private interest which 
have intruded upon it in the most brutal and aggressive form.”64 
Although not written to explain the public interest in water resources 
management, Arendt’s understanding of the public interest as a common good, her 
recognition of the challenge posed by self-interest, and her articulation of the proper 
place for private interests in a public interest analysis fit surprisingly well into the 
water resources paradigm.65 The most basic public or communal value associated 
                                                   
59 Id. at 103–04 (emphasis in original). 
60 See Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves, Hannah Arendt, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/ [https://perma.cc/RQ3R-C6MR]. 
61 Arendt, supra note 57, at 105. 
62 Arendt points to the example of the juror to illustrate her point. When called upon 
for jury duty, each of us is asked to set aside our private feelings and administer justice as 
neutrally as possible. Id. at 104–05.  
63 See, e.g., Suzanne Duvall Jacobitti, The Public, the Private, the Moral: Hannah 
Arendt and Political Morality, 12 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 281, 287 (1991) (noting that Arendt 
“was not hostile to the private sphere”).  
64 Arendt, supra note 57, at 108. 
65 Arendt’s understanding of the public interest is firmly grounded within the liberal 
tradition. See id. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau spoke of a “general will” that 
encompassed only common interests. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 58 
(Christopher Betts trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1762). As opposed to “the will of all,” 
the general will was not merely a sum of individual interests but rather a set of shared values 
that transcended a person’s particular station. Id. at 62. To Rousseau, the general will was 
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with water resources is for meeting essential human needs. But it also includes such 
things as ecological health, aesthetic values, and recreational opportunities for 
fishing, boating, and swimming. The prospective value of water resources to future 
communal users should play a role as well.  
Protecting the communal values associated with water resources does not mean 
that public interest demands are absolute. Accommodating other uses of water will 
often be necessary and can usually be done without unduly compromising public 
values. But a water resources law that is supposed to protect the public interest 
should ensure an appropriate level of protection for public values before private 
rights are even considered.  
A useful strategy for persuading decision-makers about the merits of protecting 
communal values in water before protecting private rights might employ John 
Rawls’ “veil of ignorance.”66 Rawls’ thought experiment asks parties to assume an 
original position where “no one knows his place in society, his class position or 
social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like.”67 If all parties were to define 
the public interest from behind the veil of ignorance, they would be more likely to 
support communal interests that benefit society broadly, as opposed to private 
interests that would benefit only the privileged few.68  
A Rawlsian approach to the public interest in the water resources context might 
identify appropriate baselines for protecting communal values in water. As 
                                                   
preeminent and could not be contradicted. Id. In fact, the social contract hinged on each 
citizen putting “his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the 
general will.” Id. at 55. Rousseau’s forebearer, John Locke, described a similar concept that 
he termed the “publick good.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 278 (1st ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). While leaving the term undefined, Locke insisted that 
legislators must act in the public good rather than acting to promote private interests, and his 
writing suggested at least one shared value that might be encompassed within the public 
good—the basic sustenance of all men. Id. at 303–06; see Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and 
the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. REV. 525, 538–39 (2007).  
66 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971). This “veil of ignorance” strategy 
was suggested by Stefano Moroni in the context of planning theory. See Stefano Moroni, 
Towards a Reconstruction of the Public Interest Criterion, 3 PLAN. THEORY 151, 163 (2004).  
67 RAWLS, supra note 66, at 137. 
68 In this way, Rawls uses the veil of ignorance to show his clear preference for a 
political approach that emphasizes communal values over simply maximizing private 
benefits. He believes that the utilitarian approach leads to an unacceptable distributional 
inequity that allows some men to prosper but denies other men fundamental baseline 
interests: “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override.” Id. at 3. The veil of ignorance, therefore, is helpful in 
identifying the certain interests that all men ought to be afforded in society. Rawls’ work 
echoes the ethos of Immanuel Kant, who also believed that men only ought to act in a manner 
that would be consistent, regardless of his station in society: “I ought never to act except in 
such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” IMMANUEL 
KANT, THE MORAL LAW 74 (H.J. Paton trans., Routledge Classics 1948). 
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suggested above, these baselines might include, for example, water to meet basic 
human needs, minimum instream flows or lake levels, minimum water quality 
standards, and minimum ecological health standards. Again, private water rights and 
uses would be allowed and fully expected under this system. But, as Arendt suggests, 
private rights should only be recognized after the primary public interests are 
protected and preserved.69  
The public interest, of course, is an inherently dynamic concept. Accordingly, 
an adaptive mechanism should be built into any definition to allow for efficient 
changes as values change and as new information becomes available that better 
informs public needs and how to protect them. A dynamic conception of the public 
interest is particularly important for managing water resources where water supplies 
can fluctuate wildly due to droughts, floods, and climate change. While some 
academics and policymakers might prefer the more certain posture of a static public 
interest, all can take comfort from the fact that changes to the public’s understanding 
of communal needs evolves slowly—and, for the most part, predictably—as new 
information becomes available and as societal values evolve.70 
 
IV.  A PROCESS FOR DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
Even if interested parties could agree that the public interest should be defined 
in terms of communal values, the nature and scope of those communal values—and 
the manner in which they should be protected under a public interest standard—must 
still be fleshed out. The key question to be answered here is what procedural norms 
should be adopted to achieve both a good outcome and one that will be embraced, 
or at least accepted, by the public as a legitimate reflection of public interest values. 
The procedural norms to which I refer include: (1) appropriate advance notice of a 
proposal, or a pre-proposal; (2) one or more opportunities for meaningful civic 
engagement through written comments and public meetings or hearings; (3) a 
decision process that transparently reflects how the decision-maker responded to 
significant comments from the public; and (4) a process for review of the final 
decision by an impartial arbiter. Such procedures can help policymakers collect and 
process context-specific information used to identify and assess communal values, 
and ultimately to define the public interest.71  
A process, of course, is only as good as its implementation. In an excellent 
essay aimed at reconciling the public interest with environmental philosophy, Ben 
Minteer argues for defining the public interest through a deliberative process, 
following an approach advocated by the American philosopher John Dewey.72 
                                                   
69 See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying discussion. 
70 See generally Ben A. Minteer, Environmental Philosophy and the Public Interest: A 
Pragmatic Reconciliation, 14 ENVTL. VALUES 37 (2005); Grant, Two Models, supra note 28. 
71 FLATHMAN, supra note 24, at 53–63. 
72 See generally Minteer, supra note 70, at 44–49; see also François-Pierre Gauvin, 
Nat’l Collaborating Ctr. for Healthy Pub. Pol’y, What Is a Deliberative Process?, Pub. No. 
1193 (Oct. 2009), http://www.ncchpp.ca/docs/DeliberativeDoc1_EN_pdf.pdf 
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Although Dewey does not mention the term, and Minteer mentions it only in passing, 
both seem to favor a process with robust give-and-take that reflects the civic 
republican ideal.73 Cass Sunstein has described civic republicanism as embracing a 
deliberative process that promotes political equality for the purpose of achieving a 
definable common good; where engaged parties sublimate their private interests and 
instead act as citizens committed to achieving the public interest.74 As described by 
Sunstein, civic republicanism offers a seemingly perfect framework for identifying 
the public interest in water resources. 
While civic republicanism seems an obvious choice for developing a public 
interest standard, it must be approached with care due to the very real risk that it 
might be co-opted by special interests. More specifically, civic republicanism is 
quite rightly described as an “ideal,” meaning that it cannot be fully realized in the 
real world.75 Try as they might, people do not generally sublimate their private 
interests or the interests of their clients when engaged in deliberative processes, even 
when they are asked to do so (and perhaps even when they honestly try to do so). 
On the contrary, public choice theory predicts, with some reliability, that powerful 
and concentrated private interests are likely to overwhelm the more diffuse public 
interest in civic engagement processes.76 
If the public choice problem is real, then the best solution for this problem is to 
ask the agency decision-maker to rise above the fray and make a choice that, in the  
 
 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/9RRQ-PPQN]; JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 207 (1927) 
(“A class of experts . . . is so removed from common interests as to become a class with 
private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all.”). 
73 See Minteer, supra note 70, at 47–49; see also Win McCormack, Are You 
Progressive?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 20, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/147825 
/progressive-vital-term-us-political-life-lost-significance [https://perma.cc/7CLS-QHW5]. 
McCormack describes Dewey’s philosophy as “an ongoing deliberative process through 
which bearers of individual rights address issues facing their political community as a whole 
and chart its future together.” Id. According to McCormack, Dewey “redefined, in other 
words, the ‘negative rights’ of liberalism and the ‘positive rights’ of civic republicanism as 
mutual necessities.” Id. 
74 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1544–45 
(1988); see also Mark Squillace, Embracing a Civic Republican Tradition in Natural 
Resources Decision-Making, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 
195 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010). 
75 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (discussing how government can be structured to achieve 
the civic republican ideal); David A. Martin, The Civic Republican Ideal for Citizenship, and 
for Our Common Life, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 301, 306–07 (1994). 
76 See EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE—A PRIMER 58–59 (2012); JAMES BUCHANAN 
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 285–88 (1962); Earl Latham, The Group 
Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 376 (1952) (addressing the 
dynamic of public versus private interest in policy decisions). 
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mind of the decision-maker, best reflects societal values and public needs, as 
informed by the best information available, including information derived through a 
meaningful and deliberative public process.  
Acknowledging the essential role of the decision-maker in carrying out the 
challenging task of ascertaining an objective, normative “public interest,” not unduly 
influenced by private interests, lends further support for adhering to a view of the 
public interest that reflects communal values as promoted above. This is because 
both the utilitarian and pluralist approaches described above play to the strengths of 
the rent-seeking77 proclivities of concentrated private interests. The loudest and most 
influential voices in a process that follows one of these approaches can easily 
overwhelm those voices representing the public interest in the common, shared 
values of water resources. While this risk is not entirely absent from a process that 
focuses on communal values, it is far less likely to intrude into the agency decision 
because private interests are theoretically off the table. 
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that, at least in the context of 
water resources management, the public interest should ultimately reflect communal 
values—as ascertained by the relevant water management agency or officials 
following a meaningful and deliberative public process that embodies the civic 
republican ideal. 
 
V.  DISTINGUISHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FROM THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
 
The roots of the public trust doctrine (PTD) run deep, tracing back at least to 
the time of the Emperor Justinian and the “Institutes” or code that bears his name. 
In the Book of Things, the Justinian Code provides as follows: 
 
1. By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, 
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one, 
therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore . . . . 
2. All rivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing in a port, or in 
rivers, is common to all men. 
3. The seashore extends as far as the greatest winter flood runs up. 
4. The public use of the banks of a river is part of the law of nations, just 
as is that of the river itself . . . .78 
 
Public rights of use are thus the hallmark of the PTD, and accordingly, the PTD 
has much in common with the public interest. At its core, it protects public rights in 
communal water-related resources, including public use of the shore and the bed of 
waterways, the rights of fishing and public access, and perhaps even the right to the 
                                                   
77 See BUTLER, supra note 76, at 76. Butler describes “rent seeking” as “the attempt by 
particular groups to persuade governments to grant them these sorts of valuable monopolies 
or legal privileges.” Id.  
78 J. INST. 2.1.1–.4 (J.B. Moyle trans. Oxford, 1911). 
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water itself for certain communal uses.79 These might fairly be seen as public interest 
values.  
But the public interest in water paints a wider swath that is not tied entirely to 
the water or waterway. It might include, for example, opportunity costs, equitable 
or distributive justice80 concerns, economic factors, and cultural considerations. 
Moreover, unlike the PTD—which, as part of the common law protects public trust 
values independently of any other government action, the public interest in water 
resources functions (or at least should function) as a specific factor to be assessed in 
any decision that allocates, reallocates, or manages water resources.81 
The two concepts also differ in how they are invoked. While the PTD has 
historically been grounded in the common law, the public interest in water arises 
specifically and almost universally from positive law. Thus, as a common law 
doctrine, the recognition of the PTD is advanced through litigation. The public 
interest, by contrast, typically arises in the context of public deliberation and 
participation during the administrative decision-making process.82  
Notwithstanding these differences, I fully concede that states can protect public 
values in water resources through either or both the public trust doctrine and a public 
interest review of water rights. Scholars have written extensively about the public 
trust doctrine and its potential for embracing newfound public values, such as 
ecosystem services and recreational opportunities.83 In 1983, the California Supreme 
Court gave voice to this idea in its famous decision in National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court84—commonly called the Mono Lake case. In the Mono Lake 




                                                   
79 State laws and constitutions commonly provide for state ownership of water 
resources on behalf of the people of the state. States then, arguably hold their water resources 
as trustee for the people. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 
1983). 
80 As used here, distributive justice refers to the fair distribution of goods—in this case, 
water and access to water—among all members of a society.  
81 As a normative standard mandated by positive law, the public interest ought to 
permeate all aspects of agency decisions involving the management of water resources. 
82 See, e.g., Brian Maffly, Environmentalists, Feds, and Utahns Agree: Don’t Send 
Green River Water to Colorado, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/environment/2018/11/08/finally-something/ [https://perma.cc 
/K996-EQEN] (discussing participation of multiple stakeholders in hearing arguing against 
proposed interstate water project, citing the effect on public recreation and instream flows). 
83 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public 
Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecologic 
Public Trust, 37 ECOL. L.Q. 71 (2010); Mudd, supra note 41, at 291–92; Joseph L. Sax, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. 
L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).  
84 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
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rights possessed by the City of Los Angeles did not bar the State from affording 
some protection for public values in the Lake, including the adverse ecological 
impacts of water withdrawals by the City from tributaries feeding Mono Lake.85  
Still, the Mono Lake decision arguably conflates common law public trust 
doctrine with the positive law, public interest standard. Indeed, as applied in Mono 
Lake, the PTD has much more in common with the public interest than with its 
common law antecedents,86 and it thus offers a useful framework for applying public 
interest criteria in the review of water rights applications.  
To the extent that the PTD has, in fact, evolved to encompass values that are or 
should have been historically protected by the public interest, including those 
inherent in the water resources themselves, I recognize and acknowledge their likely 
overlap. For purposes of this Article, however, the public interest is distinguished 
from the traditional common law public trust doctrine, and the following analysis 
focuses only on the former. 
 
VI.  DISTINGUISHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FROM INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION 
 
An additional distinction that must be acknowledged is that between public 
interest review and instream flow protection. Protecting minimum instream flows87 
                                                   
85 Id. at 728. The court found that the State of California had an “affirmative duty” to 
protect public trust values in water resources including scenic and ecological values. Id. 
Somewhat controversially, the court held that “[i]n exercising its sovereign power to allocate 
water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions 
which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.” Id.  
86 Indeed, to support its PTD holding, the Court invokes a California statute that 
requires the State Water Board to account for “[t]he use of water for recreation and 
preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources . . . when it is in the public 
interest” when making water allocation decisions. Id. at 726 (emphasis added) (quoting CAL. 
WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1959)). The Court also cites a second provision that authorizes 
the Board to establish terms and conditions for appropriations “as in its judgment will best 
develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest, the water sought to be appropriated.” Id. 
(emphasis added) (quoting CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1969)). 
87  
In the simplest terms, instream flow is the water flowing in a stream 
channel . . . This simple concept belies the difficulty of determining what that 
flow should be among competing uses for water, such as irrigation, public supply, 
recreation, hydropower, and aquatic habitat. The simple definition may not 
account for variations in flow levels across different seasons and wet, dry, and 
normal years. A challenge facing natural resource managers is to find a workable 
balance among these demands and use appropriate methods to quantify instream 
flow needs for each of these uses. 
 
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, THE SCIENCE OF INSTREAM FLOWS: A REVIEW OF THE 
TEXAS INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM 32 (2005), https://www.nap.edu/read/11197/chapter/5 
[https://perma.cc/G63M-5PRL]. 
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for recreational, ecological, and aesthetic purposes is plainly the kind of public value 
that might normally be considered under the public interest, as I use that term in this 
Article. Yet many Western states purporting to protect the public interest in water 
nonetheless require that, in order to protect uses that depend on a minimum instream 
flow, the State or private parties must first acquire water rights for instream flow 
purposes by standing in line with other appropriators. This arguably turns the public 
interest assessment on its head. 
Consider, for example, the Wyoming Constitution, which demands that the 
State deny water rights that are contrary to the public interest.88 This requirement is 
reinforced by a provision in the Wyoming statutes governing water rights 
applications, which declare that, where a proposed water use “threatens to prove 
detrimental to the public interest, it shall be the duty of the state engineer to reject 
such application . . . .”89 If this requirement were enforced based upon a reasonable 
interpretation of the public interest as described above, then presumably water rights 
would be conditioned on preserving minimum stream flows, and Wyoming would 
not need a separate program to acquire and protect instream flows. Yet, as will be 
described in Part VIII, Wyoming routinely ignores the public interest standard 
enshrined in its water law, and thus fails even to consider—let alone protect—public 
values in the state’s waters.  
In 1986, Wyoming did adopt its own instream flow law, which allows the State 
Game and Fish Commission to recommend the issuance of instream flow permits in 
the name of the State for the limited purpose of protecting fisheries.90 But, as with 
other water rights, instream flow rights hold a priority date as of the date of the 
application, which means that private water rights with earlier priority dates may 
lawfully deny water needed to protect minimum stream flows.91  
While instream flow laws such as the one adopted by the State of Wyoming 
have done much to protect stream flows, they have also faced many challenges.92 
And these challenges would simply not arise if states were committed to a fulsome 
                                                   
88 WYO. CONST. art. XIII, § 3. 
89 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503. (2019). See also the comparable provisions on 
groundwater at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-932(c) (2019). 
90 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws 140 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1001–10014 
(2019)). The State Game and Fish Department, which manages instream flow segments in 
the State acknowledges that the State has thus far protected “just over 2 percent of all stream 
miles in the state.” See Instream Flow Information, WYO. GAME & FISH DEP’T, 
https://wgfd.wyo.gov/Fishing-and-Boating/Instream-Flow-XStream-Angler [https://perma. 
cc/KG52-KV8K] (last visited July 24, 2018). If water rights were conditioned on protecting 
stream flows up front many more miles would likely be protected without the need for 
priority dates and instream flow designations.  
91 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-1007 (2019). 
92 See generally Adell L. Amos & Christopher R. Swenson, Evaluating Instream Flow 
Programs: Innovative Approaches and Persistent Challenges in the Western United States, 
61 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. FOUND. 22-1 (2015) (analyzing the different challenges 
facing several western states’ instream flow laws). 
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application of public interest standards. Instead, the protection of minimum stream 
flows and other public values would be imposed as a condition of approving any 
water rights, as is done in a few states like California.93 This approach honors the 
primary role of the public interest in water resources management, allowing private 
rights in water only after these public rights are protected. Not only would statutes 
like the Wyoming instream flow law become unnecessary, but they might actually 
be seen as counterproductive since they threaten to compromise public interest rights 
on the altar of priorities.  
Perhaps it is too late in the day to be claiming public interest rights in the face 
of a long history of state decisions that granted vested water rights without actually 
protecting public interest values. But, as the California Supreme Court demonstrated 
in the Mono Lake case, public rights in water that appear to have been lost as a result 
of prior appropriations can be reclaimed, at least in part, when courts acknowledge 
a legal duty to protect public values in water.94 And decision-makers and courts can 
protect these values even as they limitedly consider the ramifications of upsetting 
senior appropriators’ settled expectations.95  
In contrast to the Wyoming approach to instream flow protection, a few states 
have chosen to protect stream flows outside of the priority system.96 The State of 
Washington offers perhaps the best examples of this more robust model that uses 
the public interest standard to protect instream flows and arguably other public 
values. Like most Western states, Washington has positive law requiring it to deny 
any application that “threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest.”97 
Washington’s Water Resources Act of 1971 reinforces this requirement in the 
context of instream flows by mandating that minimum base flows be protected when 
approving applications. And where conflicts arise, applications should only be 
approved if “it is clear that overriding considerations of the public interest will be 
served.”98 To implement this policy, water permits in Washington are reviewed by 
                                                   
93 See CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 2019). 
94 See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).  
95 See, e.g., id. at 363. 
96 California and Washington are the primary examples. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1257; 
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290(3) (2019). 
97 WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290(3). 
98 The quality of the natural environment shall be protected and, where possible, 
enhanced as follows:  
 
(a) Perennial rivers and streams of the state shall be retained with base flows necessary 
to provide for preservation of wildlife, fish, scenic, aesthetic and other environmental 
values, and navigational values. Lakes and ponds shall be retained substantially in their 
natural condition. Withdrawals of water which would conflict therewith shall be 
authorized only in those situations where it is clear that overriding considerations of the 
public interest will be served.  
(b) Waters of the state shall be of high quality.  
 
Id. § 90.54.020(3). 
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the Department of Ecology, the same agency that manages the State’s environmental 
program.99 This institutional structure seems to facilitate the State’s willingness to 
place conditions on water permits to protect instream flows, which makes other 
forms of streamflow protection unnecessary.  
 
VII.  THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE 
 
Modern Western water law evolved from the legal systems established in the 
nineteenth century mining camps of the Western United States.100 Until at least 
1866,101 the miners were technically trespassers on federal public lands. Partly 
because the federal government lacked a significant presence in the Western United 
States during the middle part of the nineteenth century, the miners established 
mining camps with a local government structure that set out rules for allocating 
mineral rights.102 The basic principle that evolved was to protect the first person who 
discovered a valuable mineral deposit and diligently worked toward its 
development.103 As miners came to realize that they would need substantial amounts 
of water to process their claimed mineral resources, they also learned that water 
resources in the West were relatively scarce.104  
The common law riparian system that existed throughout the country at the time 
tied water rights to riparian land ownership.105 This system was of little use to miners 
because it lacked certainty in terms of the availability of the water supply.106 
Consequently, miners quickly adapted their system for allocating mineral rights to 
apply to water allocation decisions as well; hence, “first in time, first in right.”107 
When agrarian settlers followed the miners out West, they saw the advantage that 
the prior appropriation doctrine offered them as well.108 As the earliest settlers, they  
 
                                                   
99 Id. § 90.54.020(1); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-173-050 (2019). 
100 See A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR., DAVID H. GETCHES & REED D. 
BENSON, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 76 
(6th ed. 2009).  
101 Congress first provided for the private acquisition of public mineral lands in the 
Lode Law of 1866. See R. S. § 2339, ch. 262 § 1–2, 14 Stat. 251, 251 (1866). 
102 See JOHN LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 13 (1987) (“In 
the mining camps themselves, the miners had worked out, in the best democratic tradition, 
their own system for determining rights and obligations in the exploitation of a resource to 
which they had no legal claim.”). 
103 See CHERYL OUTERBRIDGE ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 4.09 (2d ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter AMERICAN LAW OF MINING]. 
104 See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 
317, 318–19 (1985). 
105 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 6.01(a.01). 
106 See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 83. 
107 See WELLS A. HUTCHINS, 1 WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 
164 (1971). 
108 See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 83. 
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could secure for themselves the most valuable lands and water rights, and thus 
protect themselves from claims brought by future settlers.109  
As the nineteenth century wore on, the federal government adopted laws that 
effectively acquiesced in the legal structure established for the mining camps, 
including their rules for the appropriation of water.110 And as the Western territories 
achieved statehood, the new states built into their constitutions the basic tenets of 
the prior appropriation doctrine.111  
Even as prior appropriation came to dominate the water law of the Western 
United States, the states uniformly recognized that water resources were public 
assets. The 1876 Colorado Constitution, for example, provides that “[t]he water of 
every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated . . . is hereby declared to be the 
property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state 
. . . .”112 Thus, while the states guaranteed the right of private parties to claim water 
rights based upon priority, they retained the authority to manage the water resources, 
at least in part to protect the public rights inherent in the water. As part of that 
management, every Western state has established a comprehensive permitting 
scheme to govern the acquisition and administration of water rights.113 With the 
notable exception of Colorado, which adopted a system of water courts,114 executive 
branch agencies administer these water allocation programs.115 
The prominent state role in the administration of water rights led the noted trial 
lawyer, Moses Lasky, to declare approvingly in 1929 that “prior-appropriation is the 
law nowhere in the West.”116 To be sure, “allowing settlers to appropriate water . . . 
                                                   
109 Id.  
110 For example, “An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over 
the Public Lands” provides that: 
 
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, 
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the 
same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the 
decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be 
maintained and protected in the same; and the right of way for the construction of 
ditches and canals for the purposes herein specified is acknowledged and 
confirmed . . . .  
 
Act of July 26, 1866, R. S. § 2339, ch. 262, §9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (codified at 43 
U.S.C. § 661 (2018)). 
111 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §5; WYO. CONST. art. XIII, §5. 
112 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. 
113 See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 295. 
114 Id. 
115 See JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN, MARK SQUILLACE, & SAMUEL KALEN, 
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 879 (3d ed. 2016) (“Colorado is the only 
appropriation state that never adopted a statutory permit procedure.”). 
116 Moses Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by the 
State—Via Irrigation Administration, 1 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 161, 170 (1929). 
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with no record of title or rights, could not stand.”117 But, as Lasky saw it, the water 
law of the Western states was designed not only to protect priorities but also the 
public values associated with the water. Indeed, the administrative permit systems 
that are nearly universal among the Western states require the relevant state agencies 
to account for and protect these public values before granting private parties water 
rights.118 Lasky lavished particular praise on the administrative system established 
in Wyoming under the leadership of Elwood Mead. Lasky describes Mead as “one 
far-sighted man”119 and quotes extensively from Mead’s seminal work: Irrigation 
Institutions. One particular passage quoting Mead’s work merits repeating: 
 
[N]ecessity has led to . . . a gradual decrease in the freedom of the 
appropriator and an increase in control exercised by the public authorities. 
This change has been so gradual that the legislatures have . . . in effect 
abandoned the doctrine of prior appropriation, although retaining the word 
in their statutes. The person using the water must secure a permit from a 
board of the State officials, and . . . the right acquired is not governed by 
the appropriator’s claim but by the license for diversion issued by the 
authorities. The tendency toward . . . public supervision is manifest in the 
other arid States and it seems only a question of time when the doctrine of 
appropriation will give way to complete public supervision.120  
 
The forward-thinking Lasky, and Elwood Mead before him, understood the 
limitations of a pure form of prior appropriation. But their assumption that state 
administrators or the courts would use the permit system to protect the public 
interests in water has thus far proved illusory, at least in most Western states. 
Nonetheless, opportunities to revive the long-dormant role of the public interest in 
water administration remain. In particular, a decline in overall demand for water 
resources121 could provide an opening for making more water available for public 
                                                   
117 Id. at 173. 
118 While Colorado water rights are adjudicated in the State’s water courts, they have 
adapted their system such that it works very much like a permit system, albeit with a bit more 
formality. See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 303–05. 
119 Lasky, supra note 116, at 172.  
120 Id. (quoting ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 82 (1903)). Somewhat 
ominously, Mead laments the tendency of government institutions to grant large speculative 
water rights, noting that “[o]rganized selfishness is more potent than unorganized 
consideration for the public interests.” ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 87 (1903). 
Ironically, while most states have proven adept at fighting off speculative claims, they have 
proved far less capable of exercising their responsibility to consider and protect the public 
interests. See, e.g., High Plains A & M v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 
724 (Colo. 2005). 
121 See Trends in Water Use in the United States, 1950–2015, U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURVEY, https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/trends-water-
use-united-states-1950-2015?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects 
[https://perma.cc/Q74B-4CMP] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019). 
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uses. On the other hand, cyclical drought,122 and climate change123 threaten to make 
this a far more difficult challenge.  
 
A.  Appropriative Water Rights as Property 
 
Like fish and wildlife,124 water is generally considered a public resource that, 
in its natural state, cannot be privately owned.125 As previously noted, every Western 
state, including the twelve states specifically described in this Article, expressly 
declares in its statutes or constitution that the waters of the state are publicly 
owned.126 Furthermore, each of these states preserves the public’s rights and may 
have some duty to regulate the use of the state’s water for the benefit of the public.127  
Before the states established modern regulatory programs to handle the 
administration of water rights, priorities were established based upon the first 
affirmative step to divert water and apply it to a beneficial use. Beginning with 
Wyoming in 1890, however, all Western states now establish priority dates based 
upon the date of the application to the state seeking to apply water to a beneficial 
use;128 or, in the case of Colorado, to the date of the application to a water court for 
a conditional right.129  
  
                                                   
122 See generally B. LYNN INGRAM & FRANCES MALAMUD-ROAM, THE WEST WITHOUT 
WATER: WHAT PAST FLOODS, DROUGHTS, AND OTHER CLIMATIC CLUES TELL US ABOUT 
TOMORROW (2013) (discussing the changing water situation in the Western United States). 
123 National Climate Assessment: Water Supply, U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
RESEARCH PROGRAM (2014), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/report-findings/ 
water-supply [https://perma.cc/6FTQ-NZL3]. 
124 See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 115, at 384–85.  
125 See id. at 702. 
126 ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.030 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (2019); 
CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 1; MONT. 
CONST. art. IX, § 3(3); NEB. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.025 (2019); 
N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 
(West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2019); WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
127 See Charles T. DuMars, Public Policy Considerations in State Water Allocations 
and Management, 42 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. § 24.01, §§ 24.06–24.10 (1996); see also 
ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(a)(4) (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153(A) (2019); CAL. 
WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255–1256 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE § 42-203A(5) (West 2019); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(3)(b) (West 2019) (defining “reasonable use” by reference to 
public interest criteria); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-234, 235(1), -235(2)(a)(iii), 235(4)(a) 
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370(5) (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-7, 72-12-3(E) 
(2019); West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 537.153(2), 537.170(8) (West 2019); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii), 8(1)(b)(i) (West 2019); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 
90.03.290(3) (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-931–932, 41-3-503 (West 2019). 
128 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, §§ 11.04(b), 12.02(b). 
129 Id. at § 15.05. Conditional water rights are defined in Colorado statutes. COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (2019). 
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As previously noted, water rights must be used on the land for which they were 
appropriated.130 The owner of a water right can, however, generally change the use, 
place of use, or point of diversion without loss of priority, so long as the change will 
not cause injury to other appropriators.131  
The long history of Western states’ support for private use of the public’s water 
resources has led many to believe that water rights are a kind of “super-property” 
right that is not subject to regulation in the same manner as other property rights.132 
Professor Joseph Sax has argued, however, that:  
 
[This] view is wrong. . . . Water rights have no greater protection against 
state regulation than any other property rights. . . . In fact, water rights 
have less protection than most other property rights . . . because their 
exercise may intrude on a public common.133  
 
To illustrate the tradition of subordinating private water rights to the public 
interest, Sax quotes Justice Holmes’s description of the fundamental principles 
underlying state regulation of water rights: 
 
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent of 
particular theory than the interest of the public of a state to maintain the 
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such 
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the 
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is 
omnipresent wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing as 
population grows. . . . The private right to appropriate is subject . . . to the 
initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great 
foundations of public welfare and health.134 
 
As Holmes recognized, the notion that private parties could gain absolute 
control over water was untenable, given the vital role of this resource to the 
wellbeing of the community.135  
                                                   
130 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra, note 3, § 12.02(f). 
131 However, to change the purpose of use, place of use, or point of diversion, the 
appropriator is usually required to apply to the state for permission. Id. at § 14.01(a). 
132 Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 
U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990). 
133 Id. In describing how water rights are subject to state regulation, Sax also notes that 
they are limited by definition to beneficial, non-wasteful uses and that water rights can also 
be limited by conditions articulated in the permit granting the right. Id. 
134 Id. at 274–75 (quoting Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 
(1908)). Although Hudson Cty. Water Co. involved New Jersey’s riparian-based water laws, 
Holmes makes clear that private water rights are subordinate to the public interest that exists 
“wherever there is a state.” Id. 
135 See Sax, supra note 132, at 276–77. 
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Notwithstanding the clear public aspects of water resources, no one seriously 
contests the ability of private water users to secure a vested right136 to use that 
water.137 And while the precise nature of this “usufructuary” property right varies 
from state to state,138 these rights cannot be viewed as sacrosanct. In particular, as 
Professor Sax suggests, private water rights do not include the right to use waters in 
derogation of public values. A compelling case can even be made that states are 
required to limit the allocation of water as necessary to protect these public values, 
and where states have failed to do so, such limits might fairly be implied on the basis 
of clear statutory and constitutional language.  
 
B.  Acquiring a Water Right in the Western States 
 
While an early miner needed only to post notice at the point of diversion and 
apply the diverted water to a beneficial use to perfect a water right,139 all Western 
states now have complex statutory schemes to regulate the allocation and 
administration of water rights.140 In every state except Colorado, the authority over 
water rights is vested in an administrative agency, often called a State Engineer,141 
but sometimes a state board or other state agency.142 Appropriators in these states 
                                                   
136 Thus, the state or federal government cannot take water rights from an appropriator 
without providing just compensation. For a discussion of the complex legal framework 
applicable to takings cases, see 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 35.09. 
137 The nature of the property right in water under prior appropriation is usufructuary, 
in that a water rights holder does not own the water itself, but rather owns the right to put the 
water to beneficial use. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 4.01. 
138 Generally, water in canals, conduits, reservoirs, and pipes is not considered personal 
property, while water held in containers after delivery to consumers is treated as personal 
property. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 86 (4th ed. 2009). Conversely, 
some states treat all water in the possession of a beneficial user as personal property. Id. 
139 See HUTCHINS, supra note 107, at 440. “Perfecting” a water right generally refers to 
completing all the necessary steps for the state water agency to fully recognize the water 
right, usually by issuing a license or permit. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 
12.02(e). 
140 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.01. 
141 In Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, the state engineer is charged with 
administering the water permit system. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.110, 533.325 (West 
2019); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-1 (West 2019); WYO. CONST. 
art. 8, § 2. Colorado also has a state engineer, but as that state employs a judicial system for 
issuing water rights, the state engineer’s duties primarily relate to the administration and 
distribution of existing water rights. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 (2019) et seq.  
142 States that do not have a state engineer typically administer water through a 
department of natural resources, headed by a “director” or “commissioner.” Alaska: 
Department of Natural Resources. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.010 (2019). Arizona: Department 
of Water Resources. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-103 (2019). California: State Water 
Resources Control Board. CAL. WATER CODE § 174 (West 2019). Idaho: Department of 
Water Resources. IDAHO CODE § 42-1775 (2019). Montana: Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-15-3301, 85-2-112 (2019). Nebraska: 
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must obtain a permit from the relevant state entity before they can withdraw water.143 
Colorado is unique in its use of a judicial system, but that system has evolved to 
employ some of the efficiencies of an administrative agency.144 In particular, water 
courts in Colorado have developed an application that is hard to distinguish from a 
permit.145  
The permitting process allows states to determine whether the statutory 
standards for issuing a water right have been met. Wyoming’s law is typical. It 
requires applicants to submit evidence showing a beneficial use, the availability of 
unappropriated water, adequate diversion facilities, and that the proposed use will 
not impair the value of existing rights.146 In every state discussed in this Article 
except Colorado, the agency is also authorized or required to reject or condition 
applications that are not consistent with the public interest or public welfare.147 Thus, 
as the principal architect of the original water law provisions in the Wyoming 
constitution and Wyoming statutes, Elwood Mead recognized that the permitting 
process would be essential to protecting public values.148 In practice, however, an 
application for a permit to appropriate water is generally approved if the applicant 
follows the prescribed procedures and the agency finds that there is unappropriated 
water available.149 Only rarely does the permitting agency actually take account of 
                                                   
Department of Natural Resources. NEB. REV. STAT. § 61-206 (2019). Oregon: Water 
Resources Department. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.039 (2019). Washington: Department of 
Ecology. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21A.064 (2019). 
143 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.01. 
144 Although in Colorado water rights are judicially determined, the process beings with 
an application form that is similar to other states’ permit applications. See COLO. JUD. 
BRANCH, APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS (SURFACE) (2017), 
https://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/PDF/JDF%20296W%20App%20for%20water%20ri
ghts%20(surface).pdf [https://perma.cc/BA6W-VSTB]. The Colorado system of water 
courts is described infra Part X. See also TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 303–05. 
145 Colorado uses an application for a conditional water right, which is equivalent to a 
water permit application. COLO. JUD. BRANCH, APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS (SURFACE) 
AND CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE (2013), https://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/PDF/JDF%2029 
0W%20Certificate%20of%20Notice%20R7-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CDH-B5V3]. 
146 WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-501–503 (2019). 
147 Grant, Public Interest Review supra note 28, at 683. 
148 The permit application and adjudication process designed by Mead makes it the duty 
of the State Engineer to reject an application that “threatens to prove detrimental to the public 
interest.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2019). As Moses Lasky explained:  
 
It was the fate of prior-appropriation . . . to lose ground to such administrative 
systems almost from the beginning . . . . [But] the Wyoming system, so often 
lauded over the Colorado, deserves the praise, not as a better administration, but 
as evidence of a better substantive law of waters.  
 
Lasky supra, note 116, at 171. 
149 See Ronald B. Robie, The Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917, 935 (1977); Grant, Public Interest Review supra note 28, at 688. 
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the impacts on public interest values.150 The typical process for obtaining a permit 
is described below. 
First, a prospective appropriator must formally apply to the state engineer or 
appropriate agency for a permit to withdraw unappropriated water.151 Other affected 
parties may protest or object to the application during a prescribed time period on 
the grounds that it fails to meet the state’s statutory criteria for issuance of a 
permit152—including, ostensibly, whether it is consistent with the public interest.153 
If there are properly filed objections or protests, the agency may hold a public 
hearing regarding the application.154 Based on a record compiled by an agency 
official, the permit application will be approved, disapproved, or provisionally 
approved with modifications or conditions.155 Judicial review of the agency’s 
findings may then be available. 
When an application is approved, a permit will be issued. A permit is not a 
perfected water right, but it may become one once certain conditions are met.156 In 
particular, the permittee must construct the diversion works, divert the water, and 
apply the water to a beneficial use within a defined time period.157 In most states, 
the responsible agency may impose additional conditions that might limit the 
exercise of the water right.158 After the water has been applied to a beneficial use, 
states generally require the permittee to seek an adjudication of the water right.159 
This affords the state the opportunity to limit the water right to the actual uses and 
needs of the appropriator, potentially allowing the state a second chance to consider 
the impacts of the use on the public interest.160 Once the permit has been adjudicated, 
the water right vests and the priority relates back to the time that the original permit 
application was filed.161 The final step in the process is the issuance of a document, 
                                                   
150 See infra Part VIII. 
151 See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(a). 
152 Standing requirements vary by state. California, for example, has a liberal policy, 
allowing “any interested party” to protest an application. CAL. WATER CODE § 1330 (2019). 
New Mexico has stricter requirements, limiting standing to holders of water rights that may 
be detrimentally affected by the granting of the application, or to objectors who claim that 
granting the application will be contrary to the conservation of water or detrimental to the 
public welfare and who will be “substantially and specifically affected” if the application is 
granted. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-5(B) (2019) (emphasis added). See the individual state 
summaries, infra, for the standing requirements of each state reviewed in this Article. 
153 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(b).  
154 Id. 
155 See A. DAN TARLOCK & JASON ANTHONY ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND 
RESOURCES § 5:51 (2019). 
156 See, id.; see also AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 103 and accompanying 
text defining a perfected water right.  
157 See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(d)(1). 
158 See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 155, § 5:51. 
159 See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 115, at 879.  
160 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-511 (2019). 
161 See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(d)(1). 
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alternatively called a “license,” “certificate,” “certificate of appropriation,” or 
“water right certificate,” defining the water right holder’s property interest in 
water.162 
Water rights may also be transferred to another beneficial use or place of use, 
or changes may be made at the point of diversion, subject to state law limitations.163 
Appropriators seeking to make such changes must first file an application with the 
same state authority that acted on their original permit application.164 Other 
appropriators may object to the change application on the basis that it will injure 
their rights, and in most states, the person seeking the new use has the burden of 
proving that no harm will result.165 Most Western states also authorize or require 
denial of a change application based on public interest grounds, just as they do in 
initial applications to appropriate.166 
While the preceding section focuses on the allocation of surface water, prior 
appropriation concepts also govern groundwater use in most Western states.167 
However, due in part to the hydrological complexities of groundwater and in part to 
its nature as an important common-pool public resource, state groundwater laws in 
Western states lack the consistency that is found with respect to surface water 
allocation laws.168 A comprehensive discussion of the West’s varied and complex 
                                                   
162 See id. at § 15.03(d)(2). 
163 Id. at § 14.01(a). 
164 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (2019).  
165 GETCHES, supra note 138, at 175. Once the applicant has made a prima facie case, 
however, the burden shifts to the objector to prove harm. Id. at 176. 
166 See, e.g., Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499–500 (Utah 1989). 
167 Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming are among the states incorporating appropriation concepts in 
their groundwater laws. GETCHES, supra note 138, at 273. While some of the same reasons 
for affording rights to earlier appropriators of surface water also apply to groundwater, such 
as encouraging investment and development, strict application of the doctrine is not practical. 
For example, because virtually any new pumping will have some effect on existing wells, in 
theory a senior groundwater appropriator could demand that no new pumping be allowed. 
Strict application of the doctrine also frustrates individual equities and the public interest; 
for example, it could deny rights to junior appropriators that own overlying land and have 
no other available water source, and it ignores the nonrenewable nature of some groundwater 
resources. Id. at 272–73. 
168 For example, California’s groundwater law is generally based on the correlative 
rights doctrine, providing overlying landowners with the right to a reasonable share of the 
total supply of groundwater, but the rights to exported (surplus) groundwater are determined 
by prior appropriation. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 21.03. In contrast, 
Wyoming adheres pretty closely to a prior appropriation theory with some minor 
modifications. Mark Squillace & Reed D. Benson, Wyoming, in 4 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at I.C.2. Other states give broad rights to use as much water as they 
can reasonably use on their overlying land. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-453; 
(2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-702 (2019).  
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groundwater management regimes is beyond the scope of this Article.169 Still, the 
same public interest principles that constrain surface water allocations often 
constrain groundwater allocations as well,170—though some groundwater rights 
have historically been tied to ownership of the overlying land in ways that might 
allow the groundwater user to avoid a public interest review altogether.171 
 
VIII.  THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN WESTERN WATER LAW 
 
The impetus for this Article came from the recognition of a tension in Western 
water law: while most Western states require that decisions to allocate water 
resources be carried out in a manner that protects the public interest, water allocation 
practices often fail to protect even the most basic public values, as introduced above. 
In fact, states frequently award water rights without ever considering the public 
interest, even where the law appears to require it.172 This Part surveys the water 
resources laws in twelve Western states in an effort to understand how they approach 
the public interest. I do not intend this as a comprehensive review of the water laws 
of these states. Moreover, the analysis laid out here is not limited to these states. 
Rather, these states were chosen as illustrative of the problem and because they have 
well-developed legal systems for, and substantial experience with, allocating water. 
This Part, therefore, offers a window into how—and how well—states protect public 
values in managing their water resources. 
A near-universal consensus exists in modern societies, and in particular among 
Western American states, that the public interest must be protected when allocating 
and managing water resources.173 As presented below, to varying degrees, the 
constitutions, statutes, and regulations adopted by Western American states 
specifically invoke the public interest or some similar concept as a threshold 
principle of their water law. With a few exceptions, however, actually defining the 
public interest, and applying the concept to water rights and water management 
decisions, has proved far more elusive. In particular, and as described below, only 
two states—Washington and California—appear to address the public interest 
routinely in the consideration of water rights applications, although a number of 
other states have occasionally considered and even denied applications on public 
interest grounds. 
                                                   
169 For a detailed overview of groundwater management in the western United States, 
see JEFFERY S. ASHLEY & ZACHARY C. SMITH, GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST 
(1999). 
170 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-932(c) (West 2019).  
171 See, e.g., Gregg Eckhardt, Laws and Regulations Applicable to the Edwards Aquifer, 
THE EDWARDS AQUIFER WEBSITE, https://www.edwardsaquifer.net/rules.html 
[https://perma.cc/8N6C-CWX2] (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
172 See Grant, Public Interest Review, supra note 28, at 694, 702–08.  
173 See generally Mitch Tobin, Conservation in the West Poll: Findings on Water-
related Public Opinion, WATERPOLLS.ORG (July 12, 2018), https://waterpolls.org/conservat 
ion-in-the-west-poll-2018/ [https://perma.cc/8TUR-YNB9]. 
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In Wyoming and Nebraska, the public interest in water use is rooted in those 
states’ constitutions. For example, Article VIII, Section 3 of the Wyoming 
Constitution provides that “[n]o appropriation [of water] shall be denied except 
when such denial is demanded by the public interests.”174 Wyoming’s water law 
reaffirms this requirement, providing that: 
 
[I]t shall be the duty of the State Engineer to approve all applications . . . 
which contemplate the application of water to a beneficial use and where 
the proposed use does not tend to impair the value of existing rights, or be 
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. But where . . . the proposed 
use . . . threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest, it shall be the 
duty of the state engineer to reject such application . . . .175  
 
Despite these clear legal requirements, neither the state legislature nor the 
courts nor the State Engineer’s Office have ever defined the public interest, and the 
State Engineer appears to ignore the requirement when it reviews and approves 
water rights applications.176 Applications for permits to appropriate water are 
reviewed for acceptability using a standardized checklist by the State Engineer’s 
Office,177 but this checklist includes no filter for a public interest review. Perhaps it 
should not be surprising then that the public interest has never served as a basis for 
denying water permits in Wyoming. 
During a boom in coal bed methane (CBM) development in northeastern 
Wyoming during the early part of the twenty-first century, the State Engineer issued 
thousands of water permits for CBM wells because the gas could not be removed 
without first removing the groundwater that holds the gas in place.178 The cumulative 
effect of these wells, and particularly the disposal of wastewater on the surface, was 
allegedly harming ranchers in the Powder River Basin, where much of the CBM 
development was occurring.179 This led to the only case where the public interest 
was expressly raised in the context of Wyoming state water law.180 In William F. 
West Ranch, LLC. v. Tyrrell,181 a group of Powder River Basin ranchers sued the 
State Engineer for approving groundwater permits for CBM wells without 
                                                   
174 WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (amended 2008). 
175 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2016). The State Engineer is designated under the 
Wyoming Constitution as having “general supervision over the waters of the state.” WYO. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (amended 2008). 
176 Interview with Pat Tyrell, State Engineer, State of Wyo., in Cheyenne, Wyo. (July 
12, 2007). 
177 Id. at 1. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 1 n.11.  
180 See Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 148 P. 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 1915) (upholding a 
decision to deny an application for a high dam on the Big Horn River because it would 
inundate the only viable railroad right-of-way through the basin).  
181 206 P.3d 722 (Wyo. 2009).  
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considering the public interest.182 The plaintiffs complained specifically about water 
pollution and flooding that was caused by water releases from CBM wells.183 The 
Wyoming Supreme Court never reached the merits, however, dismissing the case on 
the grounds that the case was not justiciable because the plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate that they had suffered or would suffer any direct harm as a result of the 
State Engineer’s alleged failure to comply with the Wyoming Constitution and 
enabling water statutes.184  
An even better example of Wyoming’s unwillingness to credit its constitutional 
public interest standard comes from the state’s water statutes. Wyoming law limits 
water diversions for agricultural lands to one cubic foot per second for each seventy 
acres of irrigated land.185 This is a generous but fairly common allocation of water 
for agricultural purposes.186 In 1945 and 1985, however, Wyoming effectively 
granted agricultural users a second cubic foot per second for each seventy acres of 
irrigated land,187 which is far more than is generally needed to grow crops 
efficiently.188 While in theory, Wyoming farmers are still limited by the beneficial 
use requirement, the excessive appropriations authorized under the 1945 and 1985 
laws obviously pose serious concerns about the protection of public interest values 
in streams. To make matters even worse, however, Wyoming law provides that, 
“where there may be in any stream water in excess of the total amount of all 
appropriations from said stream, such excess shall be divided among the 
appropriators therefrom in proportion to the acreage covered by their respective 
permits . . . .”189 Thus, Wyoming water law appears to authorize appropriators to 
divide up the waters of a stream until nothing is left. The dewatering of Wyoming’s 
streams as expressly authorized under this law flies in the face of the State’s 
                                                   
182 Id. at 729. 
183 Id. at 725.  
184 Id. at 729. The Court was particularly concerned that the plaintiffs were requesting 
“some type of general ruling” regarding the improper administration of CBM water “without 
challenging a specific action or requesting individualized relief.” Id. at 734–35. 
185 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (West 2019). 
186 See, e.g., Caleb Carter et al., Wyoming Small Acreage Irrigation, U. OF WYO. 3 (Dec. 
2017), http://www.uwyo.edu/barnbackyard/_files/documents/resources/irrigation/wysmall 
acreageirrigationguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN2H-6LCH] (“In Wyoming, a basic water 
right for irrigation from a surface water source is 1 cubic foot per second (cfs) for 70 acres 
of land.”).  
187 The 1945 statute, known as the Surplus Water Law, gave pre-1945 agricultural 
appropriators a second cfs. 1945 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 153, § 6 (codified as amended at WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-4-322). The 1985 statute known as the Excess Water Law gave post-1945 
and pre-1985 agricultural appropriators a second cfs. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 176, § 1 
(codified as amended WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-330 (1985)). 
188 Samantha Larson, How Much Water Does it Take to Grow America’s Favorite 
Foods?, SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/how-
much-water-does-it-take-grow-americas-favorite-foods-180954941/ [https://perma.cc/4FE9 
-8F3D]. 
189 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (emphasis added). 
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constitutional obligation to administer its water resources to protect the public 
interests. 
In an interview with the Pat Tyrell, the Wyoming State Engineer from 2001 
through 2019, he acknowledged that the public interest is “poorly defined in our 
statute,” and that permits are never rejected for public interest reasons.190 But he 
added that the “public interest” is too amorphous to be considered at the permitting 
stage.191 When asked about adopting rules to define the public interest, he indicated 
that his office had not considered that option.192 He further acknowledged that the 
current process grants water permits based only on the highest and best use of water 
at the time the decision is made and does not take into account possible future 
needs.193 In explaining this approach, the State Engineer claimed that he lacked the 
ability to be “prescient to what better use may come along ten years down the 
road.”194  
Nebraska’s initial foray into water law came in the form of the 1895 
Appropriation and Irrigation Law, which dedicated the use of waters within the State 
to its citizens.195 Nebraska subsequently amended its constitution in 1920 by adding 
a provision that tracks Wyoming’s language pretty closely, declaring that, “[t]he 
right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall 
never be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public interest.”196  
While the State does not appear to consider the public interest routinely in 
reviewing water rights application, it has nonetheless rejected several applications 
on public interest grounds—and the Nebraska Supreme Court has approved of these 
actions. For example, in Central Platte Natural Resources Dist. v. City of Fremont, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the State’s decision to deny a water diversion 
application on the grounds that the proposed project would jeopardize the 
endangered whooping crane and would thus be contrary to the public interest.197 
Likewise, in an earlier case, the Director of Water Resources rejected the 
applications of a water district seeking to make inter-basin water-diversion 
                                                   
190 Interview with Pat Tyrell, State Engineer, State of Wyo., in Cheyenne, Wyo. (July 
12, 2007). 
191 Of course, the statute specifically requires the State Engineer to reject an application 
that “threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503. 





195 See Ralph J. Fischer, Richard S. Harnsberger & Jarret C. Oeltjen, Rights to Nebraska 
Streamflows: A Historical Overview with Recommendations, 52 NEB. L. REV. 313, 348 
(1973) (citing NEB. LAWS c. 69 1895).  
196 NEB. CONST. art. XIV, § 6; see also KATE GAUL & LOGAN SEACREST, NEB. 
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH OFFICE, THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION: 1866–2016, at 159 (2017), 
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/pdf/reports/research/constitution2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6V9E-9K25].  
197 Cent. Platte Nat. Res. Dist. v. Fremont, 549 N.W.2d 112, 121 (Neb. 1996). 
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applications because these diversions could harm various endangered species.198 
Once again, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the decision on public interest 
grounds.199 In yet another case, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld an instream 
flow appropriation made pursuant to statute and specifically rejected a constitutional 
challenge to the law, finding that “the public interest demands the recognition of 
instream uses for fish, recreation, and wildlife.”200 
Most other Western states recognize the public interest by statute rather than 
under their constitutions, and their approaches to protecting the public interest vary 
widely. Washington and California are particularly noteworthy, as they are the only 
states that appear to embed a public interest review into the water permit application 
process.201  
Washington law authorizes: 
 
[t]he department of ecology [to] establish minimum water flows or levels 
for streams, lakes or other public waters for the purposes of protecting fish, 
game, birds or other wildlife resources, or recreational or aesthetic values 
of said public waters whenever it appears to be in the public interest to 
establish the same.202  
 
But this somewhat equivocal language is followed with a specific mandate: 
“[p]erennial rivers and streams of the state shall be retained with base flows 
necessary to provide for preservation of wildlife, fish, scenic, aesthetic and other 
environmental values, and navigational values.”203 A limited exception allows for 
                                                   
198 In re Applications A-16027, 495 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Neb. 1993). 
199 Id. at 34. The Nebraska statute lays out specific factors that must be considered in 
determining whether an interbasin transfer is in the public interest. These include:  
 
(1) The economic, environmental, and other benefits of the proposed interbasin 
transfer and use; (2) Any adverse impacts of the proposed interbasin transfer and 
use; (3) Any current beneficial uses being made of the unappropriated water in 
the basin of origin; (4) Any reasonably foreseeable future beneficial uses of the 
water in the basin of origin; (5) The economic, environmental, and other benefits 
of leaving the water in the basin of origin for current or future beneficial uses; (6) 
Alternative sources of water supply available to the applicant; and (7) Alternative 
sources of water available to the basin of origin for future beneficial uses. 
 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-289 (2000). The statute then goes on to note that “[t]he application 
shall be deemed in the public interest if the overall benefits to the state and the applicant’s 
basin are greater than or equal to the adverse impacts to the state and the basin of origin.” Id. 
200 In re Application A-16642, 463 N.W.2d 591, 605 (Neb. 1990); see NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 46-2,107 (1984). 
201 See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010 (2019); CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2019). 
202 WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010. 
203 Id. § 90.54.020(3)(a). The statute also requires that waters of the state “be of high 
quality.” Id. § 90.54.020(3)(b).  
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the withdrawal of water that would reduce these base flows “only in those situations 
where it is clear that overriding considerations of the public interest will be 
served.”204 The Washington Supreme Court has made clear that this exception “is 
very narrow . . . and requires extraordinary circumstances before the minimum flow 
water right can be impaired.”205 
In the context of issuing permits to appropriate water, a Washington statute 
describes four criteria that must be met before a permit to appropriate may be 
granted.206 The third criterion is that the proposed water use cannot “threaten to 
prove detrimental to the public welfare.”207 To implement this requirement, the 
Washington Administrative Code requires “the department of ecology [to] conduct 
a reconnaissance survey for the purpose of determining whether or not the interests 
of the public can best be served by the adjudication of the individual rights [to use 
waters of a stream or other source].”208 The Washington Supreme Court has also 
made clear that the State has a responsibility to consider water quality in making a 
decision on a water rights application due to the State’s Environmental Policy Act.209  
Despite the strong support for public interest review in Washington, the 
Washington Supreme Court refused to allow the Department of Ecology to consider 
the public interest in the context of a change in the point of diversion of an existing 
water right on the grounds that the relevant statute authorized such changes if they 
could be carried out without detriment or injury to existing rights, and where the 
water had been put to beneficial use.210 Although a change in the point of diversion 
may seem like a relatively minor action, the court’s decision appears to apply to any 
change application, since the statute construed by the court addressed transfers 
broadly.211 On the other hand, the court made clear that the Department retained the  
 
                                                   
204 Id. While the “public interest” is not defined here, the statute suggests that the public 
values in the state’s water resources are given paramount importance. 
205 Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 311 P.3d 6, 8 (Wash. 2013); 
Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 735 (Wash. 2000). 
206 WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290. The four criteria are (1) determining “what water, if 
any, is available for appropriation”; (2) “find[ing] and determin[ing] to what beneficial use 
or uses it can be applied”; (3) “find[ing] whether the proposed development is likely to prove 
detrimental to the public interest”; and (4) finding that “the application will not impair 
existing rights.” Id. §§ 90.03.290(1), (3). 
207 WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290(3). 
208 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 508-12-080 (2019). 
209 Stempel v. Dep’t of Water Res., 508 P.2d 166, 171 (Wash. 1973); see WASH. REV. 
CODE § 43.21C.010–.914.   
210 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille Cty. v. Dept. of Ecology, 51 P.3d 744, 746 
(Wash. 2002). The Utah Supreme Court reached a different conclusion on similar facts, but 
the relevant statute there provided that the “rights and duties of the applicants with respect 
to applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use shall be 
the same as provided in this title for applications . . . .” Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 
499 (Utah 1989) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (1980)).  
211 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.380. 
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authority to condition the existing water right on the maintenance of minimum 
stream flows.212 
Treatment of the public’s interest in California operates somewhat like 
Washington. Section 1253 of the California State Water Code provides that the State 
Water Resources Control Board (Board) “shall allow the appropriation for beneficial 
purposes of unappropriated water under such terms and conditions as in its judgment 
will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be 
appropriated.”213 In People v. Shirokow, the California Supreme Court upheld the 
Board’s decision to issue an appropriation permit subject to the condition that the 
applicant institute a brush removal program to salvage the amount of water needed, 
finding that the Board properly acted to protect the public interest.214 More 
specifically, the court held that “[i]f the board determines a particular use is not in 
furtherance of the greatest public benefit, on balance the public interest must 
prevail.”215 
Like Washington, California also provides for instream flow protection up 
front, when decisions are made to allocate water. The Director of the California 
Department of Fish and Game (Fish and Game) must identify and list streams and 
watercourses throughout the state where minimum flow levels need to be established 
in order to assure the “continued viability of stream-related fish and wildlife 
resources.” The Director must provide that list to the Board, and the Board may deny 
an appropriation permit that infringes on streamflow requirements identified by Fish 
and Game.216  
The California process seems somewhat less robust than the Washington 
approach since, unlike Washington,217 California does not require protection of 
scenic, aesthetic, environmental, and navigational values. Moreover, the Board 
retains discretion to refuse to protect streamflows identified by Fish and Game—
although technically the failure to protect those flows could be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious by a court.218 Nonetheless, protecting minimum instream flows for fish 
and wildlife will likely provide substantial protection for those other public values  
 
                                                   
212 Pub. Util. District No. 1, 51 P.3d at 765–66. (holding that appellee had “authority to 
impose instream flow conditions in a state water quality certification under § 401 of the 
Clean Water Act regardless of whether the applicant for the federal license [had] existing 
water rights.”). 
213 CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2019) (emphasis added).  
214 605 P.2d 859, 866 (Cal. 1980). 
215 Id.; see also CAL. WATER CODE § 1253; id. § 1255 (“The board shall reject an 
application when in its judgment the proposed appropriation would not best conserve the 
public interest.”). 
216 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 10001–10002 (West 2019); see also CAL. FISH AND GAME 
CODE § 1600 (West 2019) (“[T]he protection and conservation of fish and wildlife resources 
are of utmost public interest.”). 
217 See supra notes 197–198 and accompanying text. 
218 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11350 (West 2019). 
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that are specifically noted in Washington’s law, such as recreational, scenic, and 
aesthetic values.  
One additional aspect of California law warrants discussion. As previously 
noted, the public interest is best understood as distinct from the common law public 
trust doctrine. But the impact of the California Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court219 (the Mono Lake case) for protecting the public 
interest cannot be ignored. Even though the decision arguably conflates the public 
trust doctrine with the public interest by expanding the former doctrine beyond its 
historical roots, recognizing a trust responsibility for protecting the state’s water 
resources is not so different from protecting the public interests in those resources. 
Moreover, the near-universal claim of state ownership of water resources for the 
benefit of California residents, like other Western states, strongly implies a trust 
responsibility. Still, as previously described in Part V, the common law roots of the 
public trust doctrine are distinct from a statutory public interest requirement,220 and 
the public trust doctrine might be more difficult for courts to construe flexibly. 
The state closest to Washington and California in carrying out systematic public 
interest reviews of water rights applications may be Oregon, which manages its 
water resources through its Water Resources Department (OWRD), subject to 
policies and rules established by the state Water Resources Commission (OWRC).221 
At first blush, Oregon law appears somewhat narrow, as it establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that a proposed water use “will not impair or be detrimental to the 
public interest,” so long as an application meets basic criteria regarding the proposed 
water use that are generally unrelated to public values.222 Moreover, the presumption 
can only be rebutted if a protest is filed and sufficient evidence is presented at a 
hearing to rebut the presumption.223 Applications, however, are subject to OWRC 
rules,224 and those rules appear to require an affirmative public interest review by 
the state agency, including consideration of any comments or protests received.225  
This conclusion is supported by the water rights application form used in 
Oregon.226 That form requires specific information about potential impacts on 
sensitive, threatened, or endangered species, and a determination by the OWRD that 
                                                   
219 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
220 That is not to say that the public trust doctrine is unrelated to the public interest or 
that it could not be used to protect the public interest in water. It does mean, however, that 
the public trust doctrine suffers from a narrow historical pedigree that could limit its 
application in the context of water allocation and water management decisions. 
221 OR. REV. STAT. § 537.153(2) (2017). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at § 537.170.  
224 Id. at § 537.153(2). 
225 OR. ADMIN. R. §690-310-0110 (2019). 
226 See OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, SURFACE WATER RIGHTS APPLICATION 
FORM (2018), https://www.oregon.gov/owrd/WRDFormsPDF/surface_water_app.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EP6E-XD3C]. 
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the proposed use will not prove detrimental to the public interest in such species.227 
The application form also takes account of various water quality concerns as well as 
potential impacts from diversions that occur in the Columbia River basin.228  
The Oregon Supreme Court has further reinforced this more expansive view of 
the public interest inquiry. In Diack v. City of Portland, the court addressed a 
diversion by the City of Portland that would draw water from a scenic waterway.229 
The Diack court held that public interest criteria in the Oregon statute were “inexact 
terms” that the state must interpret “in a way that effectuates the underlying statutory 
policy.”230 To that end, the court held that a mere “regurgitation of the statutory 
language, without analysis” is insufficient to meet requirements for a public interest 
assessment.231 The clear implication of Diack is that the state has an affirmative 
obligation to make specific findings demonstrating how it will protect the public 
interest when it approves a water rights application.232 The current application form 
used by the state seems designed to facilitate this obligation.  
In a few states, the public interest has actually been defined by statute. For 
example, Alaska’s water statute describing the criteria for issuing a permit expressly 
provides: 
 
(b) In determining the public interest, the commissioner shall consider 
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation; 
(2) the effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed 
appropriation; 
(3) the effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational 
opportunities; 
(4) the effect on public health; 
(5) the effect of loss of alternate uses of water that might be made within 
a reasonable time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed 
appropriation; 
(6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed appropriation; 
(7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the appropriation; 
and 
(8) the effect upon access to navigable or public water.233 
  
                                                   
227 Id. at 3–4. 
228 Id. at 3. 
229 759 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 1988). 
230 Id. at 1078.  
231 Id. 
232 More specifically, the court held that “the Commission should explain more fully its 
application of the public interest criteria, pointing to the facts that it believes (if it still does) 
permit it to make the “ultimate” findings and the conclusions it draws from them.” Id. 
233 ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2019). 
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The Alaska Supreme Court employed this definition and related standards 
implementing it in Tulkisarmute Native Community v. Heinze.234 In Tulkisarmute, 
the court held that the Alaska Department of Natural Resources acted outside its 
authority when it granted water rights permits to a mining group in derogation of 
concerns raised by the Tulkisarmute Native Community Council (TNCC) regarding 
the protection of fish and wildlife resources deemed vital to the livelihood of the 
native community.235 The court held that the Commissioner should have conditioned 
the permit to protect the public interest and the rights of the TNCC as required by 
state law.236 The court emphasized that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
“may not issue a permit unless doing so is in the public interest,” and added that 
“[i]n making this determination, DNR shall consider the impacts of water 
appropriation on fish and game resources, public health, and access to navigable 
water.”237 More than anything, this case illustrates the power of simply defining the 
public interest by statute. While the Alaska definition accords the Alaska DNR wide 
discretion, it necessarily encompasses public values such as the protection of fish 
and game and public recreation, and the Alaska Supreme Court effectively required 
that these public values be protected first and not merely balanced against private 
economic interests.  
Like Alaska, Idaho also defines the public interest but in its own unique way. 
The Idaho Code authorizes the Director of the Department of Water Resources to 
reject, condition, or limit a water rights application if it finds:  
 
(a) that it will reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights; 
(b) that the water supply itself is insufficient for the purpose for which it 
is sought to be appropriated; 
(c) where it appears to the satisfaction of the director that such application 
is not made in good faith, is made for delay or speculative purposes; 
(d) that the applicant has not sufficient financial resources with which to 
complete the work involved therein; 
(e) that it will conflict with the local public interest as defined in section 
42-202B, Idaho Code; 
(f) that it is contrary to conservation of water resources within the state of 
Idaho; 
                                                   
234 Tulkisarmute Native Community Council v. Heinze, 898 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1995). 
235 Id. at 938, 942. 
236 Id. at 950; see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 93.120(e) (2019) (“(e) [t]he 
department may issue a permit subject to conditions considered necessary to protect the 
rights of prior appropriators of record and the public interest, including: . . . (3) conditions to 
maintain, or restrictions from withdrawing, a specific quantity, rate of flow or volume of 
water at a given point on a stream or body of water, or in a specified reach of stream, 
throughout the year or for specified times of the year, to achieve any of the following 
purposes: (A) protection of fish or wildlife habitat; (B) recreational purposes; (C) navigation 
. . . .”). 
237 Heinze, 898 P.2d at 950 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080). 
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(g) that it will adversely affect the local economy of the watershed or local 
area within which the source of water for the proposed use originates.238 
 
Section 42-202B defines the phrase “local public interest” as “the interests that 
the people in the area directly affected by a proposed water use have in the effects 
of such use on the public water resource.”239  
Section 42-203A also contains a proviso that prohibits establishing minimum 
stream flows under the local public interest standard, making clear that instream 
flow protections are authorized only under Idaho’s separate instream flow law.240 
This would appear to undercut the State’s ability to protect ecological and amenity 
values in water bodies in the course of approving water rights applications, as is 
done in Washington and California. In Shokal v. Dunn, however, the Idaho Supreme 
Court construed the phrase “local public interest” broadly, to encompass a wide 
range of more traditional public interest values such as fish and wildlife habitat, 
aquatic life, recreation, and water quality.241 The court based its decision on the 
explanation of the public interest contained in the instream flow law that had been 
enacted on the same day.242 At the time of the Shokal decision, however, the Idaho 
statute that requires consideration of the local public interest did not preclude the 
use of the provision to protect instream flows. That language was added to the statute 
in 2003.243 It thus remains an open question whether the Court will adhere to the 
Shokal standard if the issue arises again in another case. 
Like most Western states, Nevada law specifically requires the State Engineer 
to reject a water rights application that “threatens to prove detrimental to the public 
interest. . . .”244 In contrast to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Nevada Supreme Court 
has accepted a much narrower definition of the public interest as that term was used 
in the Nevada water rights application statute. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. 
Washoe County, the Nevada State Engineer argued that thirteen requirements from 
the state’s existing water statutes provided sufficient direction for approving 
applications in the public interest.245 These requirements, however, had little to do 
with the public values associated with water, but instead focused on such matters as 
                                                   
238 IDAHO CODE § 42-203A(5) (2019). 
239 Id. § 42-202B(3). 
240 See IDAHO CODE § 42-203A(5) (2020) (“Provided however, that minimum stream 
flow water rights may not be established under the local public interest criterion, and may 
only be established pursuant to chapter 15, title 42, Idaho Code.”); see also IDAHO CODE §§ 
42-1501–1505 (2019) (for the Water Resource Board); see also Minimum Stream Flows, 
IDAHO WATER RESOURCES BOARD, https://idwr.idaho.gov/IWRB/water-planning/minimum 
-stream-flows/ [https://perma.cc/CNT9-UXFK] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018) (providing 
public information on the Idaho’s Minimum Stream Flow program). 
241 707 P.2d 441, 448–50 (Idaho 1985). 
242 Id. at 448–49 (citing IDAHO CODE § 42-1501). 
243 H.B. 284, 57 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2003) 
244 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.370(2) (West 2019).  
245 918 P.2d 697, 698–700 (Nev. 1996).  
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whether the applicant had the financial capacity to complete the proposed project 
and whether the water would be put to a beneficial use.246 The court specifically 
rejected a broader interpretation of the public interest, such as the standard adopted 
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Shokal.247  
Given that the Nevada State Engineer identified the thirteen “public interest” 
requirements only after he was sued, it seems fair to assume that the State does not 
routinely and affirmatively address the public interest in approving water rights 
applications, even under the narrow definition it put forth in Pyramid Lake. But 
change may be coming to Nevada. In Mineral County v. State Department of 
Conservation, the Nevada Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus seeking to 
force the State of Nevada to better regulate water rights in the Walker River Basin.248 
The court’s decision was based primarily on the fact that the Walker River Basin 
was an interstate resource shared with California that had long been subject to the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.249 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Rose 
signaled a new willingness on the part of some members of the court to review the 
nature and scope of public interest claims: 
 
If the current law governing the water engineer does not clearly direct the 
engineer to continuously consider in the course of his work the public’s 
interest in Nevada’s natural water resources, then the law is deficient. It is 
then appropriate, if not our constitutional duty, to expressly reaffirm the 
engineer’s continuing responsibility as a public trustee to allocate and 
supervise water rights so that the appropriations do not “substantially 
impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.” “[T]he 
public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public 
property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to 
protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and 
tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the 
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.” Our 
dwindling natural resources deserve no less.250  
 
Echoing the Mono Lake decision, Justice Rose made clear that the owners of 
vested water rights hold these rights “forever subject to the public trust, which at all 
times ‘forms the outer boundaries of permissible government action with respect to 
public trust resources.’ In this manner, then, the public trust doctrine operates 
simultaneously with the system of prior appropriation.”251  
                                                   
246 According to the court, the Nevada State Engineer “identified [thirteen] policy 
considerations contained in Nevada water statutes . . . .” Id. at 698–99. These appear to have 
been derived largely from NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370 (West 2019). 
247 Pyramid Lake, 918 P.2d at 700; c.f. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 450. 
248 20 P.3d 800, 801 (Nev. 2001). 
249 Id. at 807.  
250 Id. at 808–09 (Rose, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
251 Id. at 808 (internal citations omitted). 
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While Justice Rose freely mixes references to the public interest and the public 
trust doctrine, his approach would take Nevada well beyond the Pyramid Lake 
decision. Not only does it signal a new focus on the public values associated with 
water, but it would also impose an affirmative duty on the Nevada State Engineer to 
protect these values.  
Justice Rose’s opinion remains particularly relevant today because, ten years 
thereafter, in Lawrence v. Clark County,252 the Nevada Supreme Court quoted 
extensively and approvingly from the Mineral County concurring opinion of Justice 
Rose in the course of expressly adopting the public trust doctrine for Nevada.253 
Although Lawrence arose in the context of the state’s ownership of the bed of a 
navigable waterway—a traditional public trust resource—the Court appeared to 
signal its readiness to move beyond Pyramid Lake and to adopt the more robust 
approach to the public interest in water resource allocation advocated by Justice 
Rose.254 The issue will likely be resolved soon, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has certified to the Nevada Supreme Court the question of whether the 
public trust doctrine applies to already-adjudicated water rights in the state.255 
Much like Nevada, Utah law requires the Utah State Engineer to approve an 
application to appropriate water only if the “proposed plan . . . would not prove 
detrimental to the public welfare.”256 The statute does not define the phrase 
“detrimental to the public welfare,” and while the Utah courts have occasionally 
been asked to consider the issue, the State does not appear to have any practice or 
procedure for routinely reviewing water rights applications to address public welfare 
concerns. For example, unlike Oregon, Utah’s water rights application forms do not 
mention the public interest, public welfare, or public values,257 and the State has no 
clear practice of conditioning permits to protect the public values associated with 
Utah’s water resources. Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court has used the public 
welfare standard in at least one case—not directly to protect public values, but rather 
to give a preference to a later water rights application over an earlier application.258 
                                                   
252 254 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2011). 
253 Id. at 610–13. 
254 Id. at 611, n.1. 
255 Mineral Cty. v. Walker River Irrigation District, 900 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(certifying to the Nevada Supreme Court questions of whether Nevada public trust doctrine 
applies to adjudicated water rights and, if so, to what extent), docketed sub nom., Mineral 
Cty. v. Lyon Cty., No. 75917 (Nev. argued Mar. 3, 2020).  
256 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii)(B) (West 2019). 
257 See Applications & Forms, UTAH DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS, 
https://www.waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/forms/ [https://perma.cc/4Z3B-FNJ9] (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2018).  
258 “Where the approval of the application would . . . interfere with the more beneficial 
use for any of the purposes mentioned, or would prove detrimental to the public welfare, the 
State Engineer is directed to reject the same.” Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 962 (Utah 
1943). To be sure, the broad purposes of the Deer Creek Project proposed by the second 
applicant, which included “domestic, culinary and irrigation purposes,” id. at 961, might 
arguably encompass some public values.  
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In Tanner v. Bacon, the court found that the express language of the Utah statute 
requiring that the State Engineer reject an application where an appropriation is 
detrimental to the public welfare, coupled with case law from surrounding states 
with similar statutes, demonstrated that the State Engineer was authorized to reject 
the earlier application “in the interest of the public welfare.”259 
The scope of “public welfare” review also arose in Bonham v. Morgan, where 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the standards that apply to the review of an original 
water rights application also apply to a permanent water transfer application, 
including the requirement that applications be rejected if detrimental to the public 
welfare.260 This set the stage for a 2016 case where the Utah Court of Appeals upheld 
a change application following a public welfare review.261 In HEAL Utah v. Kane 
County Water Conservancy District, the plaintiffs claimed that the applicants, who 
were seeking to change their point of diversion and nature of use, had the burden of 
showing that the statutory criteria for approving water rights, including the public 
welfare standard, were met.262 While the court ultimately concluded that the 
applicants had met their burden by showing that the proposed change would not 
prove detrimental to the public welfare, it recognized the importance of addressing 
the potential harm to public values, including public recreation and the natural 
stream environment.263 
New Mexico’s approach to the public interest seems to have followed a pattern 
similar to that of Utah. Much like Utah, New Mexico law requires the New Mexico 
State Engineer to approve an application “if the proposed appropriation is not 
contrary to the conservation of water within the state and is not detrimental to the 
public welfare of the state.”264 In Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, the New Mexico 
                                                   
259 Id. at 964. 
260 788 P.2d 497, 498 (Utah 1989). 
261 HEAL Utah v. Kane Cty. Water Conservancy Dist., 2016 UT App 153, 378 P.3d 
1246 (2016). 
262 Id. at ¶¶ 20, 21.  
263 The Court of Appeals noted that the lower court had found that “99% of the time the 
width of the river will be reduced less than 1.5 feet, out of an average width of approximately 
350 feet,” and “99% of the time the depth of the river would be reduced less than 1.5 inches.” 
Id. at ¶ 32. Further, although the “stretch of the Green and Colorado Rivers from Flaming 
Gorge Reservoir to Lake Powell includes critical habitat for four species of endangered fish 
unique to the Colorado River system, HEAL Utah’s evidence and experts were unable to 
demonstrate the extent of impact the diversions would have on the fish or stream.” Id. at ¶¶ 
28–36 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court relied, in part, on an earlier decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., which had held that “the 
applicant bears the burden of persuasion throughout the application process,” although the 
court described this as “a fairly low burden.” 2006 UT 16, ¶¶ 35–42, 133 P.3d 382. 
264 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-6 (LexisNexis 2019). Similar language applies to 
applications for changes of place of use, id. at § 72-5-23, and groundwater. Id. § 72-12-3(E). 
Separately, New Mexico requires the State Engineer to reject applications that are contrary 
to the public welfare. Id. § 72-5-7. New Mexico law even affords “standing for those 
asserting legitimate concerns involving public welfare and conservation of water” so long as 
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Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the State’s Board of Water Commissioners 
overturning a decision of the Territorial Engineer (the predecessor to the State 
Engineer before New Mexico became a state) involving two conflicting 
applications.265 The Territorial Engineer chose to approve the application later in 
time on public interest grounds because it was “more within the available water 
supply” and because of the lower cost of irrigation per acre.266 The Commissioners 
had determined that the public interest should be narrowly construed to allow denial 
of an application only if it would be a “menace to the public health and safety.”267 
The New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed, suggesting that the Territorial Engineer 
had properly considered the economic viability of the competing projects.268  
The application of the public welfare standard to water transfers also arose in 
New Mexico, much as it had in Utah, although in a more interesting context. In re 
Application of Sleeper involved a proposal to transfer water from traditional 
irrigation purposes to a recreational lake associated with a ski area.269 The district 
court judge denied the transfer on public interest grounds, having been persuaded 
that “to transfer water rights, devoted for more than a century to agricultural 
purposes, in order to construct a playground for those who can pay is a poor trade, 
indeed.”270 On appeal, however, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the 
provision requiring public interest review of water rights applications did not apply 
to transfer applications.271 That ruling was later changed by statute such that 
transfers are now subject to public interest reviews, just as in Utah.272  
New Mexico’s limited foray into implementing the public welfare mandate in 
its water resources law has not led to any clear policy regarding its scope, and the 
State does not seem to apply the standard routinely in reviewing all water resources 
applications.273 What does seem clear, however, is that New Mexico has faced 
                                                   
they do not impose undue burdens on the administrative and judicial processes. Id. § 72-5-
5.1. 
265 110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910). 
266 Id. at 1048, 1050.  
267 Id. at 1048. 
268 Id. at 1050. The court ultimately remanded the case to the lower court for further 
fact-finding. Id. at 1051. 
269 JOSE A. RIVERA, ACEQUIA CULTURE: WATERS, LANDS, AND COMMUNITY IN THE 
SOUTHWEST 174 (1998) (citing In re Howard Sleeper et al., Rio Arriba County Cause No. 
RA 84-53(C) (N.M. Div. 5, First Judicial Dist. April 16, 1985)). 
270 Id. at 173.  
271 In re Application of Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787, 790–92 (N.M. App. 1988).  
272 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (LexisNexis 2019). 
273 See Consuelo Bokum, Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in New 
Mexico’s Water Code, 36 NAT. RES. J. 681, 690 (1996). Bokum suggests four options 
available to the State for addressing the “public welfare” mandate: (1) interpreting public 
welfare sufficiently narrowly that the issue is essentially avoided; (2) doing nothing 
affirmatively to define public welfare and rule on the issue in an ad hoc manner; (3) relying 
solely on the definitions that evolve from the regional and state water planning process to 
produce definitions of public welfare; or (4) promulgating regulations defining public 
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serious problems with stream dewatering, including the drying up of sections of the 
mighty Rio Grande River itself.274  
As with the laws of most other Western states, Arizona statutes require a water 
rights application to be rejected if it is “against the interests and welfare of the 
public.”275 There are, however, no reported cases from Arizona concerning the 
application of this standard to water rights applications. Given the significant stream 
dewatering that has occurred in Arizona,276 it does not appear that Arizona has 
implemented this standard as might be necessary to protect public values in the 
state’s water resources.  
Montana is somewhat unique among Western states in not specifically 
providing for a public interest review of water rights applications. Nonetheless, 
Montana law requires the State Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
(DNRC) to consider certain public values, particularly in the context of large 
diversions. In cases involving more than 5.5 cubic feet per second or greater than 
4,000 acre-feet of water, the DNRC must determine whether a use is “reasonable.”277 
An application will only be approved as a reasonable use if it considers the effects 
on the quantity and quality of water, if it weighs the probable significant adverse 
environmental impacts of the appropriation, and if it protects (among other things) 
minimum streamflows for aquatic life.278 The adverse impact requirement highlights 
the important role played by the Montana Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) in 
the DNRC’s review of water permit applications. MEPA requires that state agencies 
take public comment and prepare environmental assessments or environmental 
impact statements on proposed agency actions before reaching a final decision.279  
                                                   
welfare broadly and establishing standards for applying the public welfare criterion. Id. at 
691. 
274 See Henry Fountain, In a Warming West, the Rio Grande Is Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/24/climate/dry-rio-grande. 
html [https://perma.cc/ATB3-4Q5Y]. 
275 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153.A (2019).  
276 The conservation group, American Rivers reports that “[o]nce navigable by large 
riverboats from its mouth nearly to Phoenix, the Gila below Phoenix today crosses the Gila 
River Indian Reservation as an intermittent trickle due to large irrigation diversions.” Gila 
River, AMERICAN RIVERS, https://www.americanrivers.org/river/gila-river/ 
[https://perma.cc/6FZ6-ARTN] (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). The Salt River, which is a 
significant tributary of the Gila that also flows through Phoenix, has generally run dry below 
the Granite Reef Diversion Dam, since the dam was completed in 1908. The reservoir behind 
the dam stores water for irrigation and municipal purposes. See Celebrating Arizona’s 
Rivers, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Apr. 2012), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-
Salt_River.pdf [https://perma.cc/9264-GQS9].  
277 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(3) (2019). 
278 Id. 
279 MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-102(1) (2019). See generally HOPE STOCKWELL, MONT. 
ENVTL. QUALITY COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO THE MONTANA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
(2013), https://www.leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/Environmental/2013-mepa-handbook 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CAB-982B] (providing guidance on when MEPA applies and the 
 
674 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
The final Western state considered in this Article is Colorado. Colorado appears 
last in this survey largely because it is the only state that has expressly disavowed 
an obligation to consider the public interest in the allocation of water resources. This 
is surprising not least because Colorado’s constitution contains strong language that 
appears to recognize the importance of public values in the state’s water resources: 
 
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the 
state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and 
the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to 
appropriation as hereinafter provided.280 
 
The last phrase, of course, seems to limit the preceding language, and the very 
next section of the State constitution provides that “[t]he right to divert the 
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be 
denied.”281 To be sure, this language could be construed to allow the State to decide 
that waters are not “unappropriated” if they are necessary to protect the people’s use 
of the water, as guaranteed by the State constitution. But that is not the conclusion 
reached by the Colorado Supreme Court. In Board of County Commissioners of the 
County of Arapahoe v. United States, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
“[c]onceptually, a public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of prior 
appropriation because a water court cannot, in the absence of statutory authority, 
deny a legitimate appropriation based on public policy.”282 The Colorado Supreme 
Court thus left open the possibility that the State legislature might someday require 
public interest review of water resource decisions,283 but no effort has been made to 
establish such a requirement in the more than twenty years since the court rendered 
its decision.284  
 
                                                   
appropriate steps for agencies to take). 
280 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. 
281 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. This presents an interesting contrast with the Wyoming 
constitution, which contains the same language but adds the qualifying phrase “except as 
demanded by the public interests.” WYO. CONST. art VIII, §3; see supra note 119, at 172 and 
accompanying text. 
282 Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. United States (In re Application for Water Rights of the Bd. 
of Cty. Comm’rs), 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995). 
283 As the court noted, “[t]he degree of protection afforded the environment and the 
mechanism to address state appropriation of water for the good of the public is the province 
of the General Assembly and the electorate.” Id. at 974. The court also rejected the claim 
that “beneficial use” limitation on water rights should be construed to encompass a “broad 
public policy of protecting the . . . environment,” and suggested that the state’s instream flow 
law was how the legislature intended to protect the environment. Id. at 971–72. 
284 The Colorado Court of Appeals has, however, recognized the authority of counties 
to regulate domestic water system development to ensure that such systems do not 
significantly deteriorate aquatic habitats and wetlands. City of Colo. Springs v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs of County of Eagle, 895 P.2d 1105, 1111–12 (Colo. App. 1994). 
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IX.  RESTORING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
 
A universal principle of water law—not just Western-style, prior appropriation 
law, but virtually all water law—is public ownership of the resource.285 If we accept 
this as true, then how is it even possible that state agencies charged with managing 
this public resource are allowed to make decisions that operate in plain derogation 
of the core public values associated with our water resources? If we accept a shared-
values conception of the public interest, then how is it that states can defend 
decisions to grant water rights that allow the dewatering of streams or the destruction 
of ecological or recreational values for the narrow benefit of private parties?286 Such 
claims are simply indefensible under any fair understanding of what it means that 
the state owns the water and manages it for the benefit of the people that it serves.287 
But I would go further. To my mind, the destruction of public values associated with 
our water resources for the benefit of private parties is immoral because it turns the 
very notion of protecting the public interest—a defining principle for any civil 
society—on its head. 
I am not suggesting that private parties are incapable of acquiring vested, 
private water rights. They surely are. But I am suggesting, as Justice Rose so 
eloquently stated in the Mineral County case, that states have an affirmative duty “to 
protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and 
tidelands . . . .”288 I applaud those states, such as Washington, California, and 
perhaps Oregon, that seem to have largely embedded a public interest review into 
every important decision over whether to authorize private use of water resources.289 
                                                   
285 See Bryant Walker Smith, Water as a Public Good: The Status of Water Under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 301 (2009) 
(“Today, water is unambiguously a public good. A survey of current domestic water laws 
identified forty-four countries in which significant water resources belong to the state, the 
nation, or the people; it identified no countries that disavowed such public ownership.”). See 
generally DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 
(Marcella Nanni, ed., 3d ed. rev. 2019). Caponera details water law around the globe, noting 
that even where private ownership of water has existed, “there is an increasing tendency to 
consider water as community, public, crown, or state property.” Id. at 200. He concludes that 
“[p]ublic ownership of water resources or state control over water is inevitable and 
beneficial.” Id. 
286 I include within the scope of the phrase “private parties” those special purpose 
districts that claim the benefit of a quasi-public status that operate largely for the benefit of 
their private party clients.  
287 As Justice Holmes so eloquently noted, “[F]ew public interests are more obvious, 
indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to 
maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished . . . .” Hudson County 
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908); see also supra note 84 and accompanying 
text. 
288 Mineral County v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 809 (Nev. 2001). 
289 I say “largely” because every state can surely do better. Even Washington, for 
example, seems unwilling to acknowledge that the public interest might limit water transfer 
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And while I respect that many other states have occasionally seen fit to impose 
public interest limits on private water rights, that is not nearly enough to protect the 
public interest in the public’s water resources. This Part proposes a catalog of 
policies that, if thoughtfully employed, could restore the public interest to its rightful 
place as a limitation of private water rights—without upending traditional schemes 
for water resource allocation in any significant way. 
 
A.  Define the Public Interest 
 
At the beginning of this Article, I laid out my case for defining the public 
interest in terms of those public, communal values that are typically associated with 
our water resources. I believe that those values must be protected first—before 
private parties are permitted to profit off of the public’s property. Nonetheless, I 
recognize that other considerations that arguably reflect good government policy—
and thus a different type of public value—might come into play.290 Moreover, at 
least some uses of water resources may simultaneously protect both public and 
private interests.291  
The bottom line, however, is that states must develop a concrete definition of 
the public interest such that its application in individual cases will lead to an obvious 
result. So, for example, when a private party applies for a water right that might 
damage ecological resources, the public interest restriction should routinely lead the 
water resources agency to impose conditions on the withdrawal and use of water that 
will adequately protect the stream’s ecology. Parties might argue about whether 
particular restrictions are necessary to protect the stream ecology, but not whether 
the public interest requires its protection. In this way, a concrete definition should 
apprise the relevant agencies, applicants, and members of the public of how the 
public interest will likely constrain present and future water rights.  
States will likely be tempted to follow the definitional approach taken by 
Alaska’s water permit criteria law,292 which identifies eight factors to be considered 
in reviewing water resource applications. But where these factors take account of 
private economic benefits alongside public values, as the Alaska statute does, they 
risk undermining those values, especially in light of probable rent-seeking behavior 
on the part of private applicants.293 Under the Alaska approach, for example, the 
                                                   
or change applications. 
290 See Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 962 (Utah 1943); Young & Norton v. 
Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910). In both of these cases, State Engineers favored 
later applicants who were deemed to have stronger plans for making use of a limited water 
supply. 
291 For example, water resources to meet basic human needs for water, sanitation, and 
food production might be in the public interest even if made possible by private parties. 
292 See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2019); see also supra Section VII.B, notes 166–
169 and accompanying text. 
293 To be fair to Alaska, in the only reported case where the issue arose, the court was 
careful to require that public values be protected before private interests were considered, 
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ecological health of a stream might be lawfully traded for an economic benefit to an 
individual applicant or a segment of the community. Moreover, where the agency 
decision-maker must choose from a range of unweighted but competing (and 
perhaps conflicting) factors, the final decision seems likely to reflect political 
pressure, and this could easily come at the cost of protecting actual public values. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, Alaska is well-ahead of most other states in adopting 
a reasonably clear and objective definition for the public interest that can help to 
ensure a systematic administrative decision-making process, and that will provide 
an administrative record upon which interested parties can obtain meaningful 
judicial review.  
A robust public rulemaking-style process, modeled on the civic republican 
ideal,294 with the stated goal of protecting shared public values in water resources, 
and with a nod to Rawls’ “veil of ignorance,”295 remains a better mechanism for 
realizing a concrete, meaningful, and objective definition of the public interest that 
is capable of protecting our shared values in water resources. While some degree of 
rent-seeking may be inevitable, even with a civic republican approach, strong 
ground rules and good leadership should go a long way to minimizing this 
problem.296  
 
B.  Incorporate Public Interest Review and Adaptive Management into Every 
Significant Decision Involving a State’s Water Resources 
 
Despite the fact that the public interest is imposed as a statutory or even 
constitutional limit on the authority of most states to grant water rights, many states 
routinely ignore their obligation to at least consider—let alone protect—the public 
interest.297 The most generous explanation for this failure may be that our notions 
about the shared public values associated with water resources, such as ecological 
and recreational values, have evolved considerably since water rights administration 
regimes were first put in place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In those early years, the focus was on “reclaiming” the land, which was understood 
to mean bringing the land into agricultural production through irrigation. Water was 
reasonably plentiful in those early years, and we had a far more limited appreciation 
for ecological health and the recreational opportunities associated with water 
                                                   
notwithstanding the balancing test. See Tulkisarmute Native Cmty. Council v. Heinze, 898 
P.2d 935 (Alaska 1995); see also supra Section VII.B, notes 166–169 and accompanying 
text. 
294 See DEWEY, supra note 72, at 207.  
295 See RAWLS, supra note 66, at 163. 
296 Because of the enormous pressure that will likely be brought to bear on agency 
officials by private interests, applying the civic republican approach to this process will be 
challenging. A successful process will require clear ground rules that articulate the agency’s 
overarching goal of protecting the public interest and strong leadership from the ultimate 
decision-maker. 
297 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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resources. Consequently, as water allocation procedures were established, 
consideration of the public interest fell into the background, to the point that granting 
water rights for private use was itself deemed to be in the public interest.298 The lack 
of a concrete definition for the public interest also made it easier to effectively ignore 
the requirement in the course of approving water rights applications.  
This, of course, is the reason that a definition is so important. Once the state 
develops a clear and meaningful definition of the public interest, it becomes much 
harder to avoid applying it to every request involving the use of the state’s water 
resources. This includes the initial permit application, the water right adjudication 
decision, the transfer or modification of a water right, and even more general 
decisions such as the adjudication of water rights for an entire surface or 
groundwater basin. Moreover, this “public interest review” need not be terribly 
burdensome, because state fish and game agencies can usually provide the water 
resources agency with detailed information about stream flows needed to protect 
fish and other ecological values in a given waterbody.299 And state environmental 
agencies can deliver comparable information regarding water quality. Thus, minor 
applications can be processed rather quickly. And while large diversions or changes 
in use will require more complex assessments, these can often be streamlined if the 
approval provides for an adaptive management300 program for the affected water 
resource based upon actual data that is gathered once the use commences. For 
example, a party might be granted a permit for their water right that is subject to a 
minimum stream flow to protect a fishery, with different flow regimes for different 
times of the year. But as a condition for granting the right, the appropriator might 
agree to work with the state to monitor the fishery to determine whether adjustments 
                                                   
298 When I first asked the former State Engineer of Wyoming, George Christopulos, 
how he took into account the state’s public interest requirement he responded essentially 
with this argument that private development of water resources was itself in the public 
interest. Interview with George Christopulos, Former State Engineer, State of Wyo., at the 
University of Wyoming College of Law, Laramie, Wyo. (c. 1987). This seems to be the 
essential point behind the Nevada State Engineer’s public interest argument to the Nevada 
Supreme Court in the Pyramid Lake case. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. 
Washoe Cty., 918 P.2d 697, 698–99 (Nev. 1996); see also supra note 177 and accompanying 
text. 
299 For states like Washington, Montana, and California that have statutes requiring 
some form of environmental impact assessment, it should be relatively easy to incorporate a 
public interest review into those analyses. See States with NEPA-like Environmental 
Planning Requirements, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/nepa/downloads/ 
states-nepa-environmental-planning-requirements [https://perma.cc/S2XV-YY5H] (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2018).  
300 Adaptive management is a robust, iterative process of decision-making whereby 
practitioners test hypotheses and adjust behavior, decisions, and actions based on experience 
and changed conditions. See GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 8–9 (2005), https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr654.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/P2KB-FVH8]. 
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are needed to either increase or decrease minimum flows, or to change the timing of 
those flows to better protect the public resources. These obligations could ultimately 
help or hurt the holder of the water right, but it has the advantage of allowing 
adjustments to be made on the basis of actual data rather than speculation. Moreover, 
this arrangement ensures protection of the public interest at the level that maximizes 
opportunities for private use.  
 
C.  Announce that a Public Interest “Servitude” Limits Every Vested Water Right 
 
Much water has been allocated throughout the Western United States—and 
indeed throughout the world—often without a clear statement of any ongoing 
restrictions on the right to use the respective water resources. It does not follow that 
such restrictions are therefore unavailable. Rather, states ought to make clear to the 
public, through their rules, statutes, or judicial decisions, that they retain the 
authority to regulate water rights in the public interest. 
Some in the water rights community seem to think that the state’s failure to 
include restrictions in the water right itself makes their rights inviolate, at least 
insofar as their historic use of the resource.301 They claim support for this position 
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (or 
counterpart provisions of state constitutions),302 which prohibits the taking of private 
property for a public use without just compensation.303 But a state’s imposition of 
reasonable restrictions on pre-existing water rights is unlikely to support an 
unconstitutional takings claim, for the reasons described below.  
The basic framework for analyzing a regulatory takings claim under the U.S. 
Constitution involves two parts. First is the question of whether the regulation 
                                                   
301 See, e.g., James L. Huffman et al., Constitutional Protections of Property Interests 
in Western Water, 41 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 27, 47 (2019) (“[A]ny government 
action that precludes use of the water right deprives the owner of some—or arguably all . . . 
––of the economic value of the water right, meaning just compensation must be paid to the 
owner.”); David R. E. Aladjem, There Is No Free Lunch: The Endangered Species Act, The 
Public-Trust Doctrine and the Takings Clause, Presentation at 36th Annual Am. Bar Ass’n 
Water Conference 2 (April 16–18, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
events/environment_energy_resources/2018/water/conference_materials/4_aladjem_david.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/25QR-GJFV] (“Th[e expropriation] doctrine allows for 
the government to reallocate water when it deems such a reallocation to serve the public 
interest but requires the government to compensate the owners of the rights in question. In 
that way, the expropriation doctrine provides an intrinsic limit on such takings and so 
implements one of the chief functions of the Takings Clause: preventing the government 
from forcing a few people from bearing the burdens that should properly be borne by the 
public at large.”). 
302 See, e.g., Huffman et al., supra note 301, at 39–63; Aladjem, supra note 301, at 2 
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
303 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
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amounts to a “total taking” of the property right.304 If so, then the U.S. Supreme 
Court has suggested that compensation is owed unless the regulation was necessary 
to prevent something akin to a common law nuisance.305 While questions about the 
so-called “denominator” in a takings case remain somewhat unresolved,306 it seems 
unlikely that seasonal restrictions on water withdrawals needed to protect ecological 
flows, and that are likely to vary from year to year, could be characterized as a “total 
taking.”  
If a “total taking” is not shown, then the complaining party must look at the 
character of the government regulation and its economic impact, particularly in 
terms of how it might interfere with “distinct, investment-backed expectations” of 
the owner.307 In the case of regulating water rights to protect the public interest, the 
government is seeking to regulate property that it owns under a positive requirement 
of law as against a private right to use that public property. Determining economic 
impacts will depend on an “ad hoc factual inquiry,”308 but it seems unlikely that 
regulators will impose public interest restrictions on existing water rights holders 
that would completely deprive them of the ability to use their water right for the 
purposes for which it was intended.309  
Beyond the technical legal argument, Professor Joseph Sax has explained with 
typical clarity why takings claims brought by holders of water rights will have 
difficulty making their case:  
 
Because rights granted in water have always been subject to what 
Justice Holmes called an initial limitation of private rights, the subsequent 
exercise of public authority [to limit] such rights, as in requiring releases 
for in-stream flow maintenance, is neither a redefinition nor a repudiation 
of property rights. Instead, it is a realization of a limit that was always 
there . . . . 
                                                   
304 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (A “total taking” is one 
where the government regulation deprives the owner of “all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land.”). 
305 Id. at 1022–23. 
306 Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016–17 n.7. (“The answer to this difficult question 
may lay in how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State’s law of 
property – i.e., whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal recognition 
and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant 
alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.”), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. 
v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497–501 (1987) (stating that the answer may be “where an 
owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the 
bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”).  
307 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
308 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981). 
309 See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), 
(seeking an accommodation between private water rights and public rights was the primary 
focus of the court). Similar efforts at accommodation seem likely where states impose pubic 
interest restrictions on existing water rights. 
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The roots of private property in water have simply never been deep 
enough to vest in water users a compensable right to diminish lakes and 
rivers or to destroy the marine life within them. Water is not like a pocket 
watch or a piece of furniture, which an owner may destroy with impunity. 
The rights of use in water, however long standing, should never be 
confused with more personal, more fully owned, property. . . . 
[R]ecognition of the right of the state to protect its water resources is only 
a restatement of a familiar and oft-stated public prerogative.310 
 
In other words, the public interest acts as an inherent limitation on the scope of 
private property rights in water, which in turn limits the scope of potential takings 
claims. 
 
D.  Engage the Public in the Enterprise of Managing Their Water 
 
No public resource affords as much public value as water. We use it, of course, 
to meet basic human needs, but we value water for so many other reasons—for 
swimming, boating, fishing, and for pure aesthetic enjoyment. And we lament it 
when water is polluted or depleted in ways that undermine these public uses. This is 
not to deny the value of water for private purposes, but it does mean that the public 
deserves to be engaged on all matters that may impact their shared use of a state’s 
water resources. Many communities have formed “waterkeeper” or watershed 
management organizations that are designed to stimulate and ensure public 
involvement in the management of particular public waterways.311 States could do 
much more to promote and support these types of organizations as a way to ensure 
that public values are always part of any discussion about the use of public water 
resources. Short of this, states could try to identify and engage individual fishermen, 
boaters, and others who care about protecting communal rights in water.  
State water resource agencies might also appoint a public ombudsman whose 
mission would be to represent the shared public values associated with water 
resources in every significant proceeding before the state agency. While not a perfect 
substitute for actual community engagement, an ombudsman might at least help 
ensure that someone representing communal values in water has a seat at the table. 
  
                                                   
310 See Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 
481–482 (1989). 
311 The Waterkeeper Alliance claims “more than 300 Waterkeeper Organizations and 
Affiliates that are on the frontlines of the global water crisis, patrolling and protecting more 
than 2.5 million square miles of rivers, lakes and coastal waterways on six continents.” See 
About Us, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE, https://waterkeeper.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/UNF3 
-VTGK] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018); see also Search Results for Watershed Management, 
RED LODGE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.rlch.org/search/node/watershed%20management 
[https://perma.cc/HB6S-D5WS] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018). 
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The four policies proposed above, if fully and fairly implemented, could go a 
long way toward restoring the public interest to its rightful place as a reasonable and 
necessary limit on private water rights. But no one should expect that policies like 
these will be adopted without significant public pressure. Fortunately, public-
minded citizens interested in protecting our shared public values in water are not 
without options for applying that pressure. Citizens and interest groups might, for 
example, petition state water agencies to commence a rulemaking to define the 
public interest and to establish a process for carrying out a public interest review for 
decisions impacting water resources.312 While these agencies will likely be reluctant 
to grant such petitions, the utter failure of many states to routinely consider public 
values when they approve water rights, even in the face of statutory and 
constitutional commands that they do so, could provide a compelling basis for a 
court to force a state to take some action.313  
Of course, even if a legislature or water agency agrees to take the first step by 
defining the public interest, they will likely try their best to retain maximum 
administrative discretion by adopting something along the lines of the Alaska 
balancing test.314 But shared public values will necessarily have to be a part of the 
equation,315 and interested parties can work to move public officials to give 
preference to shared public values over private interests, as in fact happened in 
Alaska’s Tulkisarmute Native Community case.316  
Interested citizens might also challenge individual water resource decisions that 
award private water rights at the expense of public rights—or decisions that fail to 
even take account of their impact on public rights. In Wyoming, an effort to 
adjudicate just such a claim was thrown out on justiciability grounds.317 But even in 
Wyoming, a plaintiff might find success if they can demonstrate a clear connection 
between a concrete injury that they suffered and the State’s failure to address public 
interests. For example, if the state were to grant a water right that allowed the 
dewatering of a stream, a party using the stream for fishing or recreational purposes 
might have a legitimate claim that their injury resulted from the State’s failure to 
protect the public interest, and would be redressable by a judicial order commanding 
                                                   
312 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-7 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.330 (2009); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-106 (1982). 
313 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-16 (West 2019) (showing how state 
administrative procedure laws often stipulate that parties “exhaust all administrative 
remedies” before becoming able to petition for judicial review of the agency). 
314 See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
315 The Alaska Water Use Act, for example, requires consideration of the effects of an 
appropriation on fish and game, public recreation opportunities, public health, and access to 
public waters. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2018). 
316 See Tulkisarmute Native Cmty. Council v. Heinze, 898 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1995). 
317 William F. West Ranch v. Tyrell, 206 P.3d 722, 736 (Wyo. 2009). Interestingly, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court intimated that the plaintiffs should have filed a petition for 
rulemaking rather than seeking a declaratory judgment in court. 
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the state to recognize the public interest.318 Further, if the state failed to even 
consider the public interest on the record of its decision in approving a water right, 
a plaintiff can argue that such failure renders the decision arbitrary and capricious.319  
Interested citizens might also work with states to amend their water rights forms 
to include questions and review criteria that can help ensure that both the applicant 
and the water resources agency to consider public values before they reach a decision 
on the application. Agencies should welcome such a change since it will provide 
them with some evidence in the decision record that these values were taken into 
account.  
 
X.  CONCLUSION AND THE PATH FORWARD 
 
My quest to understand the public interest in water resources law led me to 
consider the broader implications of a public interest standard in public policy more 
generally. Here, I had to confront the inherent ambiguity of a term that demands 
clarity because of its importance to public policy. With the help of other scholars,320 
I was persuaded that public interests are those that reflect communal values, and 
these must be distinguished from private interests. This was the frame that I used to 
assess how well Western states—and by extension, most any jurisdiction with 
positive water law—protects the important public interests in our water resources. 
Following a survey of “the public interest” in Western water law, I concluded that 
Western states—with a few notable exceptions—have largely abdicated their 
responsibility to protect these public values. In trying to understand the reasons for 
this failure, I came to realize that the term’s ambiguity provides political and legal 
cover to water resource agencies that might prefer to avoid the politically difficult 
choice that arises when proposals to grant private water rights adversely impact 
communal values.  
The most significant obstacle to solving this problem is therefore political, but 
the problem can be solved, and the solution is relatively straightforward. A state 
must begin by defining the public interest in objective, normative terms. I have 
                                                   
318 As previously noted, a Wyoming statute essentially invites agricultural appropriators 
to dewater public streams. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (1957); see also DuMars, supra 
note 127.  
319 In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983), where the U.S. Supreme Court famously described agency action as arbitrary and 
capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. 43–44. The 
failure to consider a clear requirement from a statute or the constitution would appear to 
satisfy the second of the State Farm tests. State courts often look to the federal APA arbitrary 
and capricious standard under State Farm and its progeny when assessing whether a state 
agency action was arbitrary or capricious. See, e.g., Neah Bay Chamber of Commerce v. 
Dep’t of Fisheries, 832 P.2d 1310, 1313–14 (Wash. 1992). 
320 See FLATHMAN, supra note 24; ALEXANDER, supra note 52; Arendt, supra note 57.  
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offered my own analysis of why the definition should reflect communal values and 
not private interests, although I recognize that states may find other legitimate ways 
to define the term. But however a state chooses to define the public interest, the 
definition must be concrete enough to establish a clear standard for administrators 
to apply in particular cases involving the allocation, use, and management of water 
resources. 
Further, public interest review of water resource decisions must become 
routine. Employing the definition, state agencies must ensure that every decision 
meets a public interest threshold. An adequate public interest review process must 
also allow those who might disagree with the decision an opportunity to challenge 
that decision in court on the basis of a thorough record that explains how the agency 
addressed public interest concerns.  
Finally, the longstanding failure of many state agencies to consider the public 
interest in approving water resource uses cannot excuse significant conflicts with 
public values. While it may be impractical and even impossible to fully restore 
public values in our shared water resources, we can and should restore some balance 
to the system without unduly impacting the settled expectations of existing water 
users.  
Our public waterways are the quintessential example of community property, 
and billions of people around the globe rely on public water resources both for their 
essential needs as well as their incalculable recreational, ecological, and aesthetic 
values. Once lost, these resources may prove difficult or impossible to recover. With 
heightened awareness and some political pressure, the public interest may yet prove 
to be the bulwark that protects our public waters for present and future generations. 
